Access to Trade Secret Environmental Information: Are TRIPS and TRIPS Plus Obligations a Hidden Landmine? by Shabalala, Dalindyebo
University of Dayton
eCommons
School of Law Faculty Publications School of Law
2017
Access to Trade Secret Environmental Information:
Are TRIPS and TRIPS Plus Obligations a Hidden
Landmine?
Dalindyebo Shabalala
University of Dayton, dshabalala1@udayton.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.udayton.edu/law_fac_pub
Part of the Environmental Law Commons, and the International Trade Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in School of Law Faculty
Publications by an authorized administrator of eCommons. For more information, please contact frice1@udayton.edu, mschlangen1@udayton.edu.
eCommons Citation
Shabalala, Dalindyebo, "Access to Trade Secret Environmental Information: Are TRIPS and TRIPS Plus Obligations a Hidden
Landmine?" (2017). School of Law Faculty Publications. 59.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/law_fac_pub/59
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2882146 
1 
ACCESS TO TRADE SECRET ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION: ARE TRIPS AND 
TRIPS PLUS OBLIGATIONS A HIDDEN LANDMINE?  
 
DALINDYEBO BAFANA SHABALALA1 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Freedom of Information Acts (FOIAs) have been fundamental to enabling access to 
environmental information. The effectiveness of domestic and international environmental 
regulatory standards has been dependent on ensuring strong information access regimes, 
especially for information submitted to governments by firms. However, there has been an 
ongoing tension between providing and accessing complete regulatory information on the one 
hand, and the interest in maintaining the economic value of trade secrets.  Such tensions have 
historically been managed at the domestic level within constitutional structures balancing access 
to information, privacy interests, and economic interests. However, the almost simultaneous 
advent of international norms and treaties containing obligations on ensuring access to 
information on the one hand (especially environmental treaties) and rules requiring greater scope 
and stronger protection of trade secrets and confidential business information (e.g. the TRIPS 
Agreement; the Trans-Pacific Partnership) on the other, may have altered the structure of those 
domestic processes in ways that privilege private interests in trade secrets over public interests. 
This article argues that the specificity and strength of trade secret protections in TRIPS (Article 
39) and TRIPs-plus regional and bilateral free trade agreements are a hidden landmine that may 
unravel current access to information regimes e.g. Freedom of Information Acts (FOIAs). The 
aim of this paper is to delineate the nature and scope of the limits that TRIPS and TRIPS-plus 
regimes place on domestic access to environmental information regimes for information 
submitted to governments.  
                                                 
1 Visiting Assistant Professor, Case Western Reserve University School of Law; Assistant Professor 
(International Economic Law and Intellectual Property), Department of International and European Law, Faculty 
of Law, Maastricht University. This article is adapted from research for a policy report funded by the German 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
International environmental law has in the latter part of the 20th century taken on an 
increasingly regulatory cast, asking states to create regulatory frameworks that impose 
obligations on domestic actors.  One of the core elements of this regulatory mode is the 
obligation to require economic or other actors to submit information to the state or the treaty 
implementing bodies to enable the goals of the treaty.  Thus an international agreement like the 
Basel Convention2 requires states to prevent their firms and citizens from exporting hazardous 
wastes and imposes reporting and information submission requirements (Article 4.1, Article 
4.2(f), Annex V A). Similarly, the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity3 has requirements to regulate the generation, dissemination and cross-
boundary movement of modified biological materials including notification requirements 
(Article 8, Article 20).4  At the same time, both at the national level in trade secret law5 and at the 
                                                 
2 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, 1673 
U.N.T.S. 57 (entry into force May 5, 1992) 
3 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, signed Jan. 29, 2000 in Cartagena 
2226 U.N.T.S. 208 (entry into force Sept. 11, 2003) 
4 See also: International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, signed 2 Dec. 2 1946, 161 U.N.T.S. 361 (, entry 
into force 10 November 1948) : Schedule, as amended by the Commission at the 65th Meeting, Portorož, Slovenia, 
September 2014 (Art. 21(a) requiring inspectors on each ship and allowing for observers; Section VI on information 
required - on record keeping and reporting requirements of ships operating in conjunction with a factory ship, as 
3 
international level, we have seen the development of rules requiring greater scope and stronger 
protection of trade secrets confidential business information, in particular, the Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (‘TRIPS Agreement’)6 and regional trade 
agreements like the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).7  Public access to trade secrets and 
undisclosed information submitted by private actors presents a conflict that has historically been 
managed within domestic national frameworks, balancing public interest concerns with those of 
the private actors submitting information.  The new moves to provide greater protection to 
undisclosed information threaten to unravel existing access to information regimes and make the 
implementation of new ones much more difficult.  In fact, I argue that the increasing scale of this 
conflict has exposed a fundamental flaw and fault line created by Article 39 trade secret 
obligations in the TRIPS Agreement that have remained hidden until very recently. Countries 
that have implemented their obligations under the TRIPS Agreement on the protection of 
information submitted to governments under Article 39.38 have failed to pay attention to the way 
that Article 39.2 on the general requirement to provide trade secret protection may further restrict 
their ability to disclose such information to the public.  I contend that a greater understanding of 
the relationship between Article 39.3 and 39.2 still allows room for allowing public disclosure of 
submitted and undisclosed information, if properly implemented, but that this room is much 
narrower than may have been perceived to this point.  Even that little room may be endangered 
by new obligations that states are taking on in bilateral and regional free trade agreements such 
as the Trans-Pacific Partnership. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
well as for all whaling operations; detailed information on whale takes, ships involved, capacity and methods of 
capture etc); Minamata Convention on Mercury, signed Oct. 10, 2013. Available at: 
http://www.mercuryconvention.org/Convention/tabid/3426/Default.aspx  
5 See the US Economic Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1831 (2014); US Theft of Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1832 
(2014); Directive 2016/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on the Protection of 
Undisclosed Know-how and Business Information (trade secrets) against their unlawful acquisition, use and 
disclosure, 2016 O.J. (L157) 59. 
6 Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS Agreement), Annex 1C to the Marrakesh 
Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement), signed Marrakesh, Apr. 15, 1994, 
1867 U.N.T.S. 4 (entry into force 1 January 1995). 
7 Trans-Pacific Partnership signed February 4, 2016 in Auckland, New Zealand, not yet entered into force. 
Depositary text available at: https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/about-us/who-we-are/treaty-making-process/trans-
pacific-partnership-tpp (last visited August 15, 2016). The Trans-Pacific Partnership is a regional Free Trade 
Agreement signed in February 2016 by the US and partner countries along the Pacific Rim. It covers an 
extensive set of rules and trade elements as is traditional with US FTAs and intellectual property issues are 
covered in Chapter 18, including: Article 18.47: Protection of Undisclosed Test or Other Data for Agricultural 
Chemical Products; for Pharmaceuticals - Article 18.50: Protection of Undisclosed Test or Other Data; Article 
18.51: Measures Relating to the Marketing of Certain Pharmaceutical Products; Article 18.78: Trade Secrets. 
Available at: https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Final-Text-Intellectual-Property.pdf  
8 There is a significant literature on the implications of TRIPS for the protection of pharmaceutical test data 
submitted for marketing approval of new chemical entities, but none have really examined the broader implications 
of the TRIPS and TRIPS-plus regimes for public access to submitted information and what, in particular this may 
imply for access to environmental information. For more on Article 39.3 and the debate on the extent of the 
obligations to protect pharmaceutical test data see: Carlos M Correa, “Data Exclusivity for Pharmaceuticals: TRIPS 
standards and industry’s demands in free trade agreements” in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE PROTECTION OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY UNDER WTO RULES 713-27 (Carlos M. Correa, ed., 2010); Carlos M. Correa “Test Data 
Protection: Rights Conferred Under the TRIPS Agreement and Some Effects of TRIPS-plus Standards”, in THE LAW 
AND THEORY OF TRADE SECRECY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Katherine 
J. Strandburg, eds., 2011); NUNO PIRES DE CARVALHO, THE TRIPS REGIME OF PATENTS AND TEST DATA (2014). 
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The aim of this paper, then, is to analyze the nature and scope of the limits that TRIPS 
and TRIPS plus regimes may place on domestic access to information regimes for information 
submitted to government, and their implications for environmental access in particular.  Part I 
provides a baseline for the traditional balancing framework by examining the rationales for the 
protection of trade secrets in contrast and comparison to the rationales for access to information 
regimes. Part II examines the procedural and substantive frameworks that have been used to try 
and resolve the tension between the two and provides some comparative examples of how 
specific countries have resolved this tension in their legislation and case law, looking particularly 
at the US, India and the European Union; all countries with strong access to information regimes 
but also strong intellectual property regimes as parties to the TRIPS Agreement.  Part III analyses 
the extent to which TRIPS and TRIPS-plus regimes impose specific obligations and may place 
the current approaches of the studied countries outside the scope of strict compliance with the 
TRIPS Agreement. Part IV closes with some suggestions for ways in which states can work 
within these limits to 1) preserve the integrity of existing access to information regimes 2) 
implement information submission and access rules from environmental treaties. 
 
 
 
I.  
THE UNDERLYING RATIONALES FOR ACCESS TO INFORMATION AND THOSE FOR PROTECTION OF 
UNDISCLOSED INFORMATION 
  
 
 
At the national level, access to information has generally been assured for such issues as 
deliberations of standard setting bodies in food regulation, medicines safety, and automobile 
safety.  Where the information sought or provided by governments or their agencies involves or 
implicates information submitted by private individuals or non-governmental legal entities 
(corporations, institutes, civil organizations), there has been an ongoing tension between 
providing sufficient information on the one hand, and the reasonable privacy expectations of 
individuals and the reasonable interest in maintaining the economic value of confidential 
information submitted by business and other legal persons on the other.  Such tensions have 
historically been managed at the domestic level within the constitutional structures balancing 
access to information, privacy interests, and economic interests.   
 
Ensuring access to information has a powerful normative basis.  In a democratic society, 
the ability to access information generated and used by executive and other government bodies is 
crucial to ensuring an informed citizenry that can participate properly in government decision-
making.9 Where the stakeholders are regulated entities, access to the data and rationales for 
government decisions that affect their activities is crucial for determining when and how such 
government action can be challenged.  Where the activities of such regulated entities affect third 
parties, the action or lack of action by government also creates a need for those third parties to 
have access to such information. This is the strongest and probably least controversial basis for 
                                                 
9 See Shannon M. Roesler, The Nature of the Environmental Right to Know 39 ECOLOGY L.Q. 989, 1011-16 
(2012) in her discussion of the U.S. Supreme Court’s First amendment approaches as they relate to self-
government justifications for a right to information. 
5 
justifying access to information and has generally been the basis for FOIAs world-wide.10  
However, because it is so diffuse it can also be difficult to carry out a balancing exercise at the 
agency or court level, with the interests of trade secret protection. Thus this interest has general 
been implemented at the legislative level in the manner in which legislation structure the 
relationship.  
 
However, the past 25 years has also seen an increase in the knowledge intensity of 
commercial goods and services.11 The information relating to these products and services has 
become increasingly valuable and in some cases constitute the primary means of generating 
revenue for a firm. This has meant that intellectual property protection, especially patents and 
trade secrets have become crucial components of firm strategy and survival.  The basis of much 
intellectual property is to address a public goods problem: the generation and dissemination of 
public goods is unlikely to occur in the absence of intellectual property protection. Absent such 
protection, actors are likely to keep their innovations and related information secret, impeding 
research and creating duplicative inefficiencies.  Thus intellectual property protection is usually 
situated in opposition to trade secret protection which is not normally justified as a means of 
generating public goods, or encouraging innovation.12  The difficulties in finding a public interest 
rationale for trade secrets, beyond those of industrial policy and special interest pleading have 
significant implications for what should occur when a public interest in disclosure conflicts with 
the, generally, private interest in trade secret protection. The following sections outline the 
rationales for access to information and for protection of trade secrets and discusses how these 
have been resolved as a theoretical matter and specifically in key jurisdictions.13 
 
A. Trade secrets and Confidential Business Information 
 
What are the theoretical justifications and limitations of claims over trade secrets and 
confidential business information?  The first thing to note is that the historical roots of such 
protection lie in unfair competition frameworks.14 This is recognized in the Paris Convention15 
                                                 
10 Shannon M. Roesler, The Nature of the Environmental Right to Know 39 ECOLOGY L.Q. 989, 1013 (2012). 
11 See e,g, OECD, THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY (1996). 
12 See contra Mark A. Lemley, “The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights” in THE LAW AND 
THEORY OF TRADE SECRECY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 109-139 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & 
Katherine J. Strandburg, eds., 2011). Lemley argues that there are significant disclosure and knowledge 
generation aspects to trade secret protection precisely because it discourages over-investment in secrecy 
preserving measures. 
13 In this I adopt Roesler’s choice of interest theory as the best way of explaining the nature of rights and the means 
by which rights conflicts are resolved as a practical and legal matter. See Shannon M. Roesler, The Nature of the 
Environmental Right to Know 39 ECOLOGY L.Q. 989, 997 (2012).  More generally, while Roesler’s article 
provides a general explanation of how the right to know, and the environmental right to know can be explained, I 
use the latter part of her analysis of what the underlying interests are for both trade secret protection and the right 
to access environmental information. However, I expand somewhat on her characterization of the underlying 
justifications for trade secret protection and am somewhat more skeptical of the strength and nature of the 
argument than she is. 
14 As Lemley and other authors point out, this is largely true in civil law countries while this is only a portion of 
justification for common law countries which also look to contract and tort and general misappropriation theory.  
Given the relatively sophisticated development of unfair competition law in civil law countries, there is now a 
much more significant overlap around contract and tort than has historically been the case. See e.g.  Mark A. 
Lemley, “The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights” in THE LAW AND THEORY OF TRADE 
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which requires countries to provide protection against unfair competition in Article 10bis of the 
Paris Convention (1967).16 Article 10bis(2) protected against “Any act of competition contrary to 
honest practices in industrial or commercial matters” which has been interpreted in many 
countries to also mean protection against use of information obtained in a manner  that would 
constitute unfair competition and underlay the means by which trade secret protection was 
provided.17   Thus the main concern was use of information by competitors that had been 
obtained by them in some manner that was not necessary unlawful but that was competitively 
‘unfair or dishonest’. That information has generally been required to represent an investment, 
valuable because of it not being generally known, and with significant attempts to ensure its 
secrecy.18 However, the boundaries of what constitutes a trade secret vary quite significantly not 
only between countries, but sometimes within countries. In the United States, trade secret law 
remains a state law issue although there is some uniformity due to adoption of the Model 
Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA).19 Rowe points out that trade secret protection in some US 
states has been extended to marketing strategies, contract terms, and human resources.20  In the 
context of environmental information, trade secret and CBI can essentially extend to the content 
of products on the market, the nature of the chemicals in the product, the process used to make 
the product, side effects or impacts on health, or the environment. Thus trade secret information 
about a chemical solvent, or cleaner, or aerosol spray will contain the identity of the chemicals 
used in it and even the extent of the proportions of such chemicals. In the absence of any 
obligation to disclose, such identifying information can be made subject to trade secret or CBI 
protection.21   
 
There is clearly a competitive advantage to be gained in being able to prevent others from 
knowing the exact content or formulation of your product. However, that secrecy prevents the 
generation of information about that product by any but the holder of the information, possibly 
                                                                                                                                                             
SECRECY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 112 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Katherine J. Strandburg, 
eds., 2011). 
15  Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of March 20, 1883, as revised at Brussels on December 
14, 1900, at Washington on June 2, 1911, at The Hague on November 6, 1925, at London on June 2, 1934, at Lisbon 
on October 31, 1958, and at Stockholm on July 14 1967 (“Paris Convention”) 828 U.N.T.S 107 (in force April 26, 
1970). 
16 Article 10bis(3) specifies three acts which largely revolve around false or misleading statements about sources of 
products or qualities of one’s own or a competitors products. 
17 Such an approach was not required but the Paris Convention never specified any means by which this should be 
implemented and left countries free to determine their approach. See G. H. C. BODENHAUSEN, GUIDE TO THE 
APPLICATION OF THE PARIS CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY 144 (1968). 
18 Jeanne C. Fromer “Trade Secrecy in Willy Wonka’s Chocolate Factory” in THE LAW AND THEORY OF TRADE 
SECRECY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 13 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Katherine J. Strandburg, 
eds., 2011). 
19 See Robert Denicola “The Restatements, the Uniform Act, and the Status of American Trade Secret Law” in THE 
LAW AND THEORY OF TRADE SECRECY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 18 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss 
& Katherine J. Strandburg, eds., 2011). See also 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/trade%20secrets/utsa_final_85.pdf  
20  See Elizabeth Rowe, Striking a Balance: When Should Trade Secret Law Shield Disclosures to the Government? 
96 IOWA L. REV. 791, 799 (2011). See also Mark A. Lemley, “The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP 
Rights” in THE LAW AND THEORY OF TRADE SECRECY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 112 (Rochelle 
C. Dreyfuss & Katherine J. Strandburg, eds., 2011). 
21 See Mary L. Lyndon, “Trade Secrets and Information Access in Environmental Law” in THE LAW AND THEORY 
OF TRADE SECRECY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 18 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Katherine J. 
Strandburg, eds., 2011). 
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preventing study on toxicity or other potential effects.  Thus, in terms of environmental and 
health information, trade secrets may not only impede the disclosure of such information but 
may actually serve to prevent the generation of such information.22 Coupled with the fears that 
liability may accrue if such information is disclosed, firms may actively avoid generating internal 
knowledge about harms related to their products and where they do have such information, may 
actively work to prevent the generation of confirming information. Trade secrecy and protection 
of CBI place such information in the hands of those with the strongest interest in preventing the 
generation of such information.  Thus, there is little justification for arguing that trade secret and 
CBI protection serve the aim of actually generating knowledge generally and environmental and 
health information specifically.  
 
The weak link to knowledge generation and the lack of disclosure has meant that trade 
secrets have been seen as lacking core characteristics of traditional intellectual property and thus 
were to be protected through other mechanisms such as unfair competition. This is the approach 
taken by the Paris Convention23 and adopted and continued in the TRIPS Agreement.24 There is 
also scholarly agreement that trade secrets lack core characteristics that justify other forms of 
exclusive intellectual property rights25 although there is some strong counter-argument that there 
should be a normative shift to treat trade secrets as intellectual property.26 Those arguments 
largely revolve around the idea that free-riding discourages investment in new products and 
processes and thus the protection is necessary to encourage at least a first generation of 
information.  However, such arguments also exist for patent protection for which the trade-off 
required is disclosure.  To the extent that information kept as trade secret may qualify as patent 
subject matter, the costs of providing exclusivity suggest that it should be patented. The patent 
system is meant to be calibrated to encourage investment in research that would not otherwise 
occur, given free riding and scale of investment. Trade secrecy is a redundant mechanism for 
providing that same level of encouragement unless it is specifically aimed at information that is 
not itself patentable but represents some small increment above the baseline level of investment 
in innovation that occurs in a competitive market. Even then, other more limited forms of 
exclusive rights can be provided such as utility/petty patents that still require disclosure.  The 
necessity for a public grant and protection of trade secrets also suffers from a core inefficiency: 
that much of the information, although valuable would have been generated anyway in the 
                                                 
22 Mary L. Lyndon Secrecy and Access in an Innovation Intensive Economy: Reordering Information Privileges in 
Environmental, Health, And Safety Law 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 465, 467 (2007). 
23 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of March 20, 1883, as revised at Brussels on December 
14, 1900, at Washington on June 2, 1911, at The Hague on November 6, 1925, at London on June 2, 1934, at 
Lisbon on October 31, 1958, and at Stockholm on July 14 1967 (“Paris Convention”), 828 U.N.T.S. 107 (entry 
into force 26 April 1970). 
24 Article 39, Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS Agreement), Annex 1C to the 
Marrakesh Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement), signed Apr. 15 1994, 1867 
U.N.T.S. 4 (in force Jan. 1, 1995) 
25  See generally, THE LAW AND THEORY OF TRADE SECRECY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 
(Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Katherine J. Strandburg, eds., 2011); 
26 See e.g. Mark A. Lemley, “The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights” in THE LAW AND 
THEORY OF TRADE SECRECY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 109-139 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & 
Katherine J. Strandburg, eds., 2011). See also Marco Bronckers and Natalie McNelis, Is the EU obliged to 
improve the protection of trade secrets? An inquiry into TRIPS, the European Convention on Human Rights and 
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 34(10) EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 673 (2012) arguing that TRIPS requires 
protection greater than unfair competition. 
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course of carrying out competitive business. Such things as customer lists, salaries, human 
resources, business strategies would be generated regardless and thus on that subject matter, 
trade secret fail the ‘but-for’ test i.e. would the information not have been generated ‘but-for’ the 
availability of trade secret protection. This, at a minimum, suggests that the broad subject matter 
protection that trade secrets provide is overly broad. In general, innovation arguments for 
providing trade secret protection struggle with this core public policy justification of knowledge 
generation.  
 
A second more persuasive argument is that trade secrecy prevents firms from over-
investing in secrecy measures especially where they may be better invested elsewhere.27  This is 
a serious cost and is evident in some firms such as in the chocolate and candy industry who 
impose restrictions on who they hire, internal employee information segregation, cyber and 
human security just to preserve competitive advantage.28 This is, of course an individual business 
decision of the value of its secrets, but it is also the case that such activity imposes business costs 
and there may be many firms that forgo such costs and rely on first mover advantage and 
branding. Competition has costs and those firms that over-invest in secrecy will be subject to 
competitive disadvantages if they over-invest. Competition more than a public intervention such 
as trade secret protection may be the better regulating mechanism for addressing such potential 
inefficiencies. 
 
While it is understood that trade secret protection should be retained as a business option 
for firms in a competitive market, the public policy rationale for its protection is much thinner – 
what remains is largely an argument for special interest protection of business interests, 
especially small and medium enterprises with few resources to engage in patenting, for 
example.29  This leads into the one main public policy rationale – that, as Overvalle notes, it 
allows for inter partes exchange of information so that information does flow, albeit slowly.30  
Where the claim is to information that a firm has no other interest in other than the potential for 
commercial harm, and that has little exchange value in product or process terms, there is little 
public policy rationale for such protection from a knowledge generation and dissemination 
standpoint.31  Even in the case where it may have exchange value because it reveals strategy or 
                                                 
27  See Mark A. Lemley, “The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights” in THE LAW AND THEORY 
OF TRADE SECRECY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 124-126 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Katherine 
J. Strandburg, eds., 2011). 
28 Jeanne C. Fromer “Trade Secrecy in Willy Wonka’s Chocolate Factory” in THE LAW AND THEORY OF TRADE 
SECRECY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 13 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Katherine J. Strandburg, 
eds., 2011). 
29 Mark A. Lemley, “The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights” in THE LAW AND THEORY OF 
TRADE SECRECY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 123 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Katherine J. 
Strandburg, eds., 2011). 
30 Geertrui van Overvalle, “Uncorking Trade Secrets: Sparking the Interaction between Trade Secrecy and Open 
Biotechnology”, in THE LAW AND THEORY OF TRADE SECRECY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 246 
(Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Katherine J. Strandburg, eds., 2011). See also Mark A. Lemley, “The Surprising Virtues of 
Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights” in THE LAW AND THEORY OF TRADE SECRECY: A HANDBOOK OF 
CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 127 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Katherine J. Strandburg, eds., 2011). Lemley notes that it 
allows for non-contract based information exchange that would otherwise not take place due to reluctance to sign 
broad nondisclosure agreements. 
31 See David Levine, Secrecy and Accountability: Trade Secrets in our Public Infrastructure 59 FLA. L. REV. 135, 
148 (2007). 
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human and resource capacity information, the public policy rationale remains thin.  On the other 
side of the public policy ledger, trade secret protection is not costless. Aside from some of the 
enforcement problems, discussed below, there is a broader problem of the economic costs of 
providing such protection.32 Secrecy induces inefficiency in search costs for both the holder and 
outsiders, inefficiency in duplicative research and innovation paths, and because of the indefinite 
term, reduces the diffusion and dissemination of information, limiting the pool of knowledge for 
second generation innovation.33 
 
The result of the existing relatively thin protection of trade secrets is that in most 
jurisdictions, but especially common law ones, loss of protection can occur relatively easily and 
unintentionally. Fundamentally, there is an informational problem with policing trade secrets.34  
The only way in which a person can give notice to others that a breach is occurring is by 
revealing the trade secret. In addition, where something is easily kept as a secret this means that 
it just as easy to infringe upon it in secret. The classic case is a situation where a company uses a 
secret recipe and it is obtained by another company who uses it is to improve its own food 
product. The secret holder has no way of finding out whether the other person has engaged in 
infringement without exposing the existence of the secret or communicating it to that person and 
thus destroying the secrecy. In fact, it may make sense for the holder to tolerate secret 
infringement that it is aware of, as long as it can ensure no further dissemination. This incentive 
is even greater because of a general defense in trade secret law of independent derivation or 
reverse engineering of the same process or technique35, something which again becomes difficult 
to disprove unless the holder can show breaches of its own secrecy which then may have an 
effect of destroying the existence of the trade secret. 
 
In fact, to the extent that a third party in possession of the knowledge did not themselves 
engage in the unfair or illegitimate act of accessing the secret, they are usually free to 
disseminate and use it and the only recourse that the holder of the trade secret has is to sue for 
damages against the person who acted in breach of confidence or contract or who acted 
illegitimately or unfairly in commercial terms in accessing the secret. This has led to several 
attempts within legislation and new treaties to try and address this, primarily: 
 
1. Reducing the secrecy destroying effect of disclosure to one or only a small group of other 
parties;36 
2. Increasing secondary liability for those receiving the information accessed through 
illegitimate or unfair means;37 
3. Criminalization of disclosure of trade secrets as industrial espionage thus enlarging the 
scope of traditional industrial espionage law.38 
                                                 
32 See Mary L. Lyndon Secrecy and Innovation in Tort Law and Regulation 23 N.M. L. REV. 1, 14 (1993). 
33 See Mary L. Lyndon Secrecy and Innovation in Tort Law and Regulation 23 N.M. L. REV. 1, 14 (1993). 
34 As noted by Mary L. Lyndon Secrecy and Innovation in Tort Law and Regulation 23 N.M. L. REV. 1, 2,9 (1993). 
35 See 18 U.S.C. 1839(6)(b); Article 3(1)(a)-(b) Directive 2016/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 8 June 2016 on the Protection of Undisclosed Know-how and Business Information (trade secrets) against 
their unlawful acquisition, use and disclosure, 2016 O.J. (L157) 59. 
36 See e.g. Article 3, Directive 2016/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on the 
Protection of Undisclosed Know-how and Business Information (trade secrets) against their unlawful 
acquisition, use and disclosure, 2016 O.J. (L157) 59. 
37 See 18 U.S.C 1832(a)(3). 
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 There remain however basic principles from within trade secret law governing when 
trade secrets may nevertheless not be used as a justification for preventing certain other acts or 
activities outside the boundaries of trade secret protection.: 
- Restrictions on workers’ mobility or ability to compete 
o In general, absolute restrictions on workers’ ability to move to other employment 
are not permissible except where an employee explicitly signs away such rights. 
Even in such circumstances, such restrictions must be limited.39  
- Freedom of expression40 
- Public interest relevance to public health or safety41 
 
With such exceptions, a key question is whether such disclosure may take place in the 
absence of compensation for losses. Jurisdictions answer this question differently but for 
example, in the US, regulatory disclosure is not a compensable taking in terms of the 
Constitution, except if the regulatory framework creates a reasonable expectation that a property 
interest in the trade secret will be protected.42 Where no such expectation is created because the 
regulation excludes submitted information from trade secret protection, or explicitly endorses 
disclosure and does not establish an expectation of non-disclosure, no taking of property will be 
found.43  In addition, where the nature of the information is such that there is no reasonable 
expectation that disclosure should be prevented (e.g. health and safety information) absent an 
affirmative creation of an expectation of confidentiality by the statute, no taking will be found if 
disclosure takes place.44 
 
Thus, even in on of the strongest systems of trade secret protection, there are exceptions 
that nevertheless allow disclosure and where some categories of information are excluded from 
protection for specific public policy reasons.  The thinness of trade secret protection coupled 
with relatively weak public policy justifications for providing such protection have generally 
allowed domestic systems to engage in reasonable balancing of interests in disclosure. Where the 
tension has been resolved in favor of rightsholders this has generally been a function of state 
industrial policy or interest groups taking effective advantage of the public choice framework 
surrounding policy-making on access to information. International obligations have played a 
                                                                                                                                                             
38 Article 18.78 Trans-Pacific Partnership signed Feb. 4, 2016, not yet in force. Depositary, New Zealand Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade, https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/about-us/who-we-are/treaty-making-process/trans-
pacific-partnership-tpp/text-of-the-trans-pacific-partnership/  
39 See e.g. Article 1(3), Directive 2016/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on the 
Protection of Undisclosed Know-how and Business Information (trade secrets) against their unlawful 
acquisition, use and disclosure, 2016 O.J. (L157) 59. 
40 See e.g Article 5(a) Directive 2016/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on the 
Protection of Undisclosed Know-how and Business Information (trade secrets) against their unlawful 
acquisition, use and disclosure, 2016 O.J. (L157) 59. See also Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 78 
F.3d 219 (6th Cir. 1996); Ford Motor Co. v. Lane, 67 F. Supp. 2d 745 (E.D. Mich. 1999) 
41 See e.g. Article 1(2), Directive 2016/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on the 
Protection of Undisclosed Know-how and Business Information (trade secrets) against their unlawful 
acquisition, use and disclosure, 2016 O.J. (L157) 59. 
42 See Ruckelhaus v Monsanto Co. 467 U.S. 986 (1984)  
43 Ruckelhaus v Monsanto Co. 467 U.S. 986, 1009 (1984). 
44 See Ruckelhaus v Monsanto Co. 467 U.S. 986, 1009 (1984). 
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minimal role until the more recent expansion of both subject matter in the TRIPS Agreement, 
and the current expansion of international environmental law into regulatory information 
submission regimes. The next section now looks to the rationales for access to information. 
 
 
B. Access to information and the environment 
  
As noted above, access to information has a powerful normative basis in democratic 
governance.45  This has been the basis for a whole host of freedom of information act (FOIA) 
like measures in many different countries. It has had very specific implementation in the 
environmental and health risk arena, rooted in two main considerations – the need for regulated 
entities and their stakeholders to understand how, and on what basis, the government is 
regulating them; ensuring that negative externalities are disclosed to ensure that third parties 
understand the harms that others may be causing them.  This creates a range of different 
disclosure measures that the government can engage in.  The first thing to note is that we can 
make a distinction between measures that are an expression of an affirmative obligation or action 
on the part of the government to disclose information; and those that require an affirmative 
request to the government to disclose. 
 
 Affirmative Disclosure measures and obligations 
 Motivated and affirmative requests 
o requiring a showing of standing or interest 
o no requirement of a showing of interest 
 
In addition, we need to distinguish  between those situations where firms or entities are 
submitting information to the government that is required of them, placing them in a situation 
where the government is forcing them to disclose as a prerequisite for either participating in the 
market (certain food and drug rules for example, as well as the whole field of pharmaceutical 
marketing approval) or health and safety requirements (such as occupational safety and exposure 
to chemicals)46 and those situations where they are requested to provide such information to the 
government but are not necessarily required to do so.47 
 
 In the first situation, the element of coercion means that a strong public policy 
justification is usually required and the loss of protection for secrets implied in the disclosure of 
information submitted under such a requirement may implicate commercial and financial losses, 
if not the viability of the firms so affected.  This therefore may lead to a weighing of interests. 
The situation where government has requested information that is not required presents a 
different issue in that incentives will be needed in order to encourage the generation of, and the 
                                                 
45 See Shannon M. Roesler, The Nature of the Environmental Right to Know 39 ECOLOGY L.Q. 989, 1011-16 (2012). 
46 For a comprehensive list of US regulations imposing both generation and submission requirements See Wagner, 
Wendy E. “Commons Ignorance: The Failure of Environmental Law to Produce Needed Information on Health 
and the Environment” 53 DUKE L.J. 1619, note 152 (2003-2004).  
47 This excludes those information sets that may indeed be relevant but that firms are neither required nor requested 
to provide and which Wagner argues may constitute the vast majority of relevant information regarding 
environmental harms. See Wendy E. Wagner,Commons Ignorance: The Failure of Environmental Law to 
Produce Needed Information on Health and the Environment 53 DUKE L.J. 1619, 1670-1677 (2003-2004) 
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willingness to share information. In such situations, regulators may argue a stronger need to 
bargain for access to such information with promises to keep such information secret.48 As Rowe 
discusses, in the absence of assurances that the secrecy of information will be kept, firms may 
simply refuse to submit such information absent a court ordering them to do so.49  If a requester 
challenges such a framework or decision to refuse to disclose, then a court will have to determine 
if there is a sufficient public interest that nevertheless outweighs the interest of the trade secret 
holder.  This threshold will generally be higher than that for mandated information and may 
involve examination of the legitimate expectations of submitters as well as the urgency of the 
need for such information on the part of the requester or the public generally.   
 
The categories of information inflow to public authorities therefore constitute: 
 
1. Information required to be submitted to government by a legislative or regulatory act 
2. Information not required to be submitted to government, 
 voluntarily disclosed 
 involuntarily disclosed due to court order 
 
 The category of information affects the rights of the submitter and the extent to which it 
can be disclosed to and used by parties other than the government agency. The justifications for 
disclosure also play out differently where the information is involuntarily disclosed or needs to 
be voluntarily disclosed.50 The extent of access to each category of information will be 
influenced by the kinds of rationales being put forward for systematic disclosure in each specific 
case. 
 
1. Utilitarian arguments 
 
Information should be disseminated to those best situated and motivated to generate information 
about the possible harms of a particular product. 
 
While this clearly includes the government, it also implicates the broader scientific 
community.  While users or communities of users are directly implicated, they are probably least 
capable to engage in this kind of knowledge generation.51  This rationale is somewhat attenuated 
in the circumstance where the government requires the holder of the information to generate and 
report such information to the government itself.  Then the rationale primarily relates to the 
                                                 
48 See Elizabeth Rowe, Striking a Balance: When Should Trade Secret Law Shield Disclosures to the Government? 
96 IOWA L. REV. 791, 803 (2011). See also Shannon M. Roesler, The Nature of the Environmental Right to Know 39 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 989, 1042 (2012).   
49 Elizabeth Rowe, Striking a Balance: When Should Trade Secret Law Shield Disclosures to the Government? 96 
IOWA L. REV. 791, 803 (2011). 
50 Shannon M. Roesler, The Nature of the Environmental Right to Know 39 ECOLOGY L.Q. 989, 1042 (2012).   
51 See Shannon M. Roesler, The Nature of the Environmental Right to Know 39 ECOLOGY L.Q. 989, 1004 (2012). 
She characterize this as part of a broader interest in the advancement of intellectual knowledge, although later in 
her article she focuses on the interest in generating health and environmental knowledge generally. She 
concludes that the interest in public access is weaker given the lack of knowledge in the general population. I 
argue, as does Wagner that this discounts the broader structure of how scientific research occurs and the interest 
of competitors in generating negative health and safety information. Thus even where government funding is a 
significant part of information generation, this still justifies ensuring replication studies as well as enabling peer 
review. 
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capacity of the government to verify the accuracy of the submitted information and the ways in 
which dissemination to the public serves to allow the scientific process of falsification and/or 
verification to take place.  Where the scientists in regulating agencies have insufficient resources 
and capacity, the argument for public dissemination is stronger.52 Where resources and capacity 
are sufficient, the argument for dissemination beyond the government is weaker, although the 
necessity for replication studies as well as proper peer review may still provide a strong 
justification for broad dissemination. All of this is based on a basic market analysis: in the 
absence of requirements to do so, the producer has the least incentive to generate health and 
safety information related to the product.53 As rational actors, where the harms generated are not 
immediately and specifically obvious and the risk of discovery or causal linkage is weak, the 
producer is least likely to engage in any behavior that would increase the discovery or liability 
risk. Where they are required to do so, they have little or no interest in its disclosure; and finally, 
even where such disclosure takes place they have little incentive to generate more complete and 
further information than is necessary to participate in the market.54 Market incentives may tend to 
favor externalizing certain types of risks and costs. Regulation or tort law may also provide an 
incentive to not seek or generate information regarding a product especially where knowledge, or 
foreseeability of harm may generate liability and ignorance of the link between the effects and 
the exposure mitigates responsibility.55  This means that short term immediate and visible harms 
are prioritized over diffuse, long term harms such as in the case of exposures that may lead to 
cancers in old age.56  It implicates the timing of disclosure, in that producers have an incentive to 
also delay disclosure, whereas immediate and even pre-market disclosure of information may be 
crucial to preventing harms rather than simply responding well after the fact of harms having 
taken place. Wagner also points to another situation: the government could require the producer 
to generate the information themselves as to the potential harms (both short term and long 
term)57. In such a case, the generation function of disclosure discussed above is clearly weaker.  
                                                 
52 As is the case for most regulatory agencies especially in the environmental arena. See Wendy E. Wagner, 
Commons Ignorance: The Failure of Environmental Law to Produce Needed Information on Health and the 
Environment 53 DUKE L.J. 1619, 1689 (2003-2004). 
53 See Wendy E. Wagner, Commons Ignorance: The Failure of Environmental Law to Produce Needed Information 
on Health and the Environment 53 DUKE L.J. 1619, 1622 (2003-2004). 
54 See Mary L. Lyndon, “Trade Secrets and Information Access in Environmental Law” in THE LAW AND THEORY OF 
TRADE SECRECY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH449-50 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Katherine J. 
Strandburg, eds., 2011). Wagner also argues that in fact, the incentives are such that they have an interest in 
investing in research aimed directly at obscuring or countering evidence of harms generated by their products.  In 
this she challenges the assumptions underlying much of the regulation in environmental law that information 
regarding externalities may be reasonably or easily discoverable. Wendy E. Wagner, Commons Ignorance: The 
Failure of Environmental Law to Produce Needed Information on Health and the Environment 53 DUKE L.J. 1619, 
1623 (2003-2004).  One small wrinkle is that where the challenges by producers take place within a transparency 
framework with full access to underlying datasets and information, such action may be beneficial to evaluations. 
55 See John D. Echevarria, and Julie B. Kaplan, Poisonous Procedural "Reform”: In Defense of Environmental 
Right-to-Know 12 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 579, 586 (2002-2003). See also Wendy E. Wagner, Commons 
Ignorance: The Failure of Environmental Law to Produce Needed Information on Health and the Environment 
53 DUKE L.J. 1619, 1640 (2003-2004) 
56 Mary L. Lyndon, “Trade Secrets and Information Access in Environmental Law” in THE LAW AND THEORY OF 
TRADE SECRECY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 451 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Katherine J. 
Strandburg, eds., 2011). See also Wendy E. Wagner, Commons Ignorance: The Failure of Environmental Law to 
Produce Needed Information on Health and the Environment 53 DUKE L.J. 1619, 1622 (2003-2004) 
57 Wendy E. Wagner, Commons Ignorance: The Failure of Environmental Law to Produce Needed Information on 
Health and the Environment 53 DUKE L.J. 1619, 1624-25 (2003-2004) 
14 
The role of the regulatory system is then to ensure that the information generated is sufficiently 
complete and that government actors have the resources to properly evaluate it. However, even 
in such cases, disclosure may be justified by the need for proper peer-review of the methodology 
and scientific basis of the work carried out by the producers and, as discussed below, as a check 
on regulators by citizens who have a right to know whether such evaluations are being carried 
out properly and in the public interest. 
 
Consumers should be informed and knowledgeable about the risks that they take when they 
choose to consume particular products.  
 
In this case, disclosure serves an important market function of allowing consumers to 
make well-informed purchasing decisions, by requiring information of ingredients to be listed on 
products.58 This serves to ensure that the market most efficiently serves those products that 
consumers consider safest and least risky based on the information that is generally known 
publicly about the ingredients included.  This presupposes that there is pre-existing and/or 
ongoing research into the information regarding those ingredients, which would need to be tested 
by a motivated actor of some sort.59  For unsophisticated consumers, ingredients listing can only 
work if accompanied by educational or other materials about those ingredients.  Thus consumer 
market behavior is a tenuous and at best secondary justification for public disclosure except 
where it allows other actors to properly test and evaluate both contents and claims of products 
and processes.  It does however, serve to remove the decision as to whether to generate health 
and safety information related to such products out of the hands of the producer and into the 
hands of those who may actually value that information.  Thus it may generate a market interest 
from others to generate such information and compete on safety in the market by showing that a 
competitor’s product or process may not be as safe as claimed, where such safety information 
has market value to consumers.  
 
2. Fairness and justice arguments 
 
Tort law 
 
These are arguments relating to who should bear the cost of harms of actions.60 Where a 
private party engages in behavior that harms others and keeps the information that creates such 
harms secret, then disclosure creates a disincentive for actors to engage in such activities and 
properly imposes the burden of preventing harm on the private party making the product.  This is 
a basic tort argument in many ways and disclosure allows the tort system to function and allows 
for the determination of foreseeability of harm and apportionment of liability appropriately. 
                                                 
58 Mary L. Lyndon Information Economics and Chemical Toxicity: Designing laws to produce and use Data 87 
MICH. L. REV. 1795, 1796 (1988). 
59 As Wagner notes, this may in fact not be the case. She points to significant ignorance regarding even basic facts 
about the state of environment in the US, largely traceable to lack of information about the existence, nature 
scale and scope of potential causal factors that have been placed in the environment. Wendy E. Wagner, 
Commons Ignorance: The Failure of Environmental Law to Produce Needed Information on Health and the 
Environment 53 DUKE L.J. 1619, 1624 (2003-2004) 
60  See Mary L. Lyndon, “Trade Secrets and Information Access in Environmental Law” in THE LAW AND THEORY 
OF TRADE SECRECY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 456 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Katherine J. 
Strandburg, eds., 2011). 
15 
Requiring parties to disclose the risks of their actions to the public allows for that.  However, in 
order to be effective such disclosure would need to function both in the pre-market phase and in 
the post-market entry surveillance phase.  As some authors have noted61, in the absence of 
disclosure, tort law has remained, generally speaking, a less than effective tool for preventing 
environmental harms, as companies can avoid liability by keeping basic information secret and 
refusing to conduct more than minimal research into harms.62  Thus they can claim lack of 
individual and broader scientific knowledge as to the potential harms of their products and the 
time of production or exposure.63 
 
Fraud prevention  
 
Those against whom a person is committing or may be committing a fraud are justified in 
seeking information and having it disclosed.  Where the fraud is general, such as to a broad 
community of consumers, the rationale for public disclosure is stronger. In many ways, this 
underlies the reason that firms are required to disclose ingredients on their products in order to 
show that their product contain the products and has the effects claimed.  This is part of 
protection of consumers not only against harm but against misrepresentation.  Thus there is an 
obligation to ensure the accuracy of representations as to efficacy or other benefits of a product 
by being able to accurately assess whether the product contains characteristics or is processed in 
a way that supports such claims.  These can include claims that a product is ‘organic’ or 
‘natural’, or presents claims that it can reduce digestive problems. Prevention of fraud is enabled 
by ensuring that ingredients are disclosed that reflect the asserted claims.  Additionally, where an 
actor is engaging in an act of infringement of another’s rights or unduly benefiting from 
misappropriating another’s work, disclosure will work to reduce such occurrences.  To the extent 
that someone seeks to claim certain information as a trade secret or as confidential business 
information, the rationale for preventing disclosure of information about violation of the law, or 
violation of the rights of others is very weak. Thus the state can justify requiring or needing to 
disclose certain information where such information is necessary to ascertain whether the 
submitter is violating the law, or violating the rights of others by committing fraud or 
infringement. Public disclosure may be even more necessary where the search costs for the 
person seeking to vindicate rights is prohibitive because of the secretive nature of the trade secret 
regime. In contrast to other intellectual property regimes where disclosure at the pre-grant stage64 
is a key part of providing notice to others of possible infringing activity, trade secrecy does not 
have that same safety valve built into it.  
 
Rights-based approaches 
 
                                                 
61 See Mary L. Lyndon, “Trade Secrets and Information Access in Environmental Law” in THE LAW AND THEORY OF 
TRADE SECRECY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 457 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Katherine J. 
Strandburg, eds., 2011).  See also Wendy E. Wagner, Commons Ignorance: The Failure of Environmental Law to 
Produce Needed Information on Health and the Environment 53 DUKE L.J. 1619, 1632-1639 (2003-2004). 
62 See Mary L. Lyndon Information Economics and Chemical Toxicity: Designing laws to produce and use Data 87 
MICH. L. REV. 1795, 1813 (1988). 
63 See Mary L. Lyndon Information Economics and Chemical Toxicity: Designing laws to produce and use Data 87 
MICH. L. REV. 1795, 1817 (1988). 
64 As is the case in patent and trademark applications. Copyright is different in that the right adheres automatically 
upon publication. 
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Access to information is also invoked as a part of the right to freedom of expression65 or 
some other right.  In the context of freedom of expression this is framed as a right to receive 
information to enable participation in public life and democratic governance. An example of this 
is Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights66, which in a series of interpretations 
by the European Court of Human Rights has consistently been found to exist, although it must be 
balanced with other rights in the broader European framework.67 In the case of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, intellectual property is treated as a human right68 and where trade 
secrets are within the intellectual property framework of a particular state, they then become 
human rights subject matter, requiring balancing with rights to access information.  As Roesler 
points out, the right to access information in this way has not found purchase in the US.69  
 
Related to the above discussion regarding consumer rights and decision-making is what 
Roesler characterizes as justification of personal liberty and autonomy.70 Broader than simply the 
narrow consumer right to make decision, this is a fundamental liberty right to choose with whom 
and which products and goods to engage.  As such, it justifies labelling laws, information 
regarding comparative efficacy of products and imposes duties of accuracy on those making 
statements into the market.71  Where the information is about health and environmental risks, this 
can implicate decisions regarding whether to live near a specific site, or to seek health treatments 
based on risk of exposure.72 Again, Roesler notes that this argument has found little purchase in 
the US except in the realm of restrictions on commercial speech and even there it has not been 
found to justify positive obligations to disclose beyond the realm of labelling laws.73 
 
A derivative right of access to information can also be drawn from the other rights such as 
the right to health and the right to a healthy environment.74 Roesler is ‘disheartened’ by the 
                                                 
65 See Shannon M. Roesler, The Nature of the Environmental Right to Know 39 ECOLOGY L.Q. 989, 1005-6 (2012). 
66 European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed at Rome, November 4, 1950, entry 
into force September 3, 1954. (as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14 supplemented by Protocols Nos. 1, 4, 6, 
7, 12 and 13) Council of Europe Treaty Series. 
67 See Társaság a Szabadságjogokért v. Hungary, Application no. 37374/05, ECHR, Judgement of 14 April 2009; 
Kenedi v. Hungary, Application 31475/05, ECHR, Judgement of 26 May 2009. Also General Comment No. 34, on 
Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (freedom of expression). 
68 See Dima v. Romania, App. No. 58472/00; Melnychuk v. Ukraine, App. No. 28743/03, Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. 
Portugal, App. No. 73049/01, 45 Eur. H.R. Rep. 36 [8301] (Grand Chamber 2007). 
69 Shannon M. Roesler, The Nature of the Environmental Right to Know 39 ECOLOGY L.Q. 989, 1006 (2012). 
70 Shannon M. Roesler, The Nature of the Environmental Right to Know 39 ECOLOGY L.Q. 989, 1007 (2012). 
71 Shannon M. Roesler, The Nature of the Environmental Right to Know 39 ECOLOGY L.Q. 989, 1016-27 (2012). 
72 Roesler makes the argument this justification can sometimes be stronger than advancing intellectual knowledge or 
self-expression. Shannon M. Roesler, The Nature of the Environmental Right to Know 39 ECOLOGY L.Q. 989, 
1010 (2012). 
73 Shannon M. Roesler, The Nature of the Environmental Right to Know 39 ECOLOGY L.Q. 989, 1007 (2012). 
74 For an extensive discussion of the US domestic implementation of this in the labor environment see Shannon M. 
Roesler, The Nature of the Environmental Right to Know 39 ECOLOGY L.Q. 989, 1016-27 (2012). Roesler comes 
to the conclusion that, at least within the US framework, the right to health and the right to a healthy 
environment do not provide a strong justification for broad public disclosure.  While she believes it is stronger in 
the context of employees right to know whether they are exposed to certain chemicals in the course of their work 
and the nature and extent of the exposure risk, she find much less purchase for a broader individual right to know 
about use and extent of chemicals unless there is an actual exposure risk and the risk is known such that 
individuals could make the assessment themselves. Thus the right to health would only justify disclosure to those 
scientists and agencies with the expertise and knowledge to carry out studies evaluating the risks but not to the 
population at large.   
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failure of the right to health to achieve the kind of disclosure necessary in the US context, where 
it seems limited primarily to justifying disclosure to the government but not broader disclosure to 
individuals. As I argued earlier in Part I.B.1, disclosure may better enable the process of 
scientific assessment and knowledge generation by independent scientists and for carrying out 
peer review in ways that the trade secret holder may not be willing to do.  Additionally, the 
failure of current US legislation to provide sufficient levels of information or generate the kind of 
information necessary may not necessarily weaken the justification coming from the right to 
health. This reflects a failure of the legislation to give proper weight to the justification and 
actually argues for placing an obligation on firms and the government to require the generation 
of such information in a manner understandable and communicable to the individual so that they 
may make their own health decisions. 
 
 
C. The structure of submission and disclosure implied by the rationales 
 
The framework for access to information has always been defined in opposition to those 
interests in not disclosing. This is not to say that the primary way in which such disclosure has 
been opposed is by private third party interests: the primary vector for justifying such access to 
information has been to government action or failure to act and the underlying facts and 
rationales for such: the third party interests have historically been secondary, relating to the 
interests in information submitted to the government.  There does however remain a third vector 
which is the direct interest by third parties in privately held information. That interest can be 
expressed by the creation of an explicit mandate for private sector actors to engage in disclosure 
themselves or to submit information to the government itself which will engage in that 
disclosure.  Examples of this include ingredients lists on food packaging or cleaning solvents. It 
seems appropriate to discuss those elements and examples that require actors to engage in 
disclosure to the public at large either themselves or through the government separate from other 
specific purposes for which the government itself may require information to be submitted. Thus 
we can add a third category to the two discussed above: 
 
3. Information required to be disclosed to the public: 
 by the private parties themselves 
 by submitting to a government entity which will then disseminate the information via 
publicly accessible databases and other mechanisms. 
 
This overlaps with the categories of outflow of information as well of course: 
1. Information affirmatively disclosed by the government 
 Of information submitted voluntarily 
 Of information submitted as part of a mandatory requirement 
2. Information disclosed on request by the government 
 Of information submitted voluntarily 
 Of information submitted as part of a mandatory requirement 
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3. Information disclosed by the private party 
 As required by the government 
 
Given the nature of the claims for protection of trade secrets and the claims for access to 
information, it seem natural that state agencies and governments have taken diverse approaches 
to addressing the tension between them.  The resolutions have been targeted at either specific 
problems in specific sectors (e.g. pharmaceuticals or environmental pollutants) or have been 
generated out of common law application by courts resolving disputes.  Even domestic access to 
information regimes have varied both as a matter of general application, and in specific areas 
where they try to take trade secret concerns into account.  The application of external obligations, 
such as the TRIPS Agreement, to provide greater protection for trade secrets may have distorted 
the broad regulatory and sectoral specific bargains that in many countries have previously 
applied.   
 
The next section provides a general overview of the nature of the tension or conflict and 
provides some concrete domestic examples from the US, India and Europe, India. 
 
 
II.  
SUBSTANTIVE FRAMEWORKS FOR RESOLVING THE TENSION BETWEEN ACCESS TO INFORMATION 
AND THE PROTECTION OF UNDISCLOSED INFORMATION 
 
 A. The Nature of the Conflict 
 
 
From the discussion in Part I, we can see that there can be common purposes in 
protection of trade secrets and that of access to information.  Where protection of trade secrets 
results in the generation and greater availability of information, it aligns itself with the broader 
aim of ensuring better information on environmental and health risks.  The generation of such 
information has a corollary in that it needs to be disseminated to where it is likely to be most 
useful.  Thus, to the extent that trade secret protection restricts the flow of such information to 
those best situated to assess and address environmental and health risks, and thus formulate 
policy and make decisions, it remains in fundamental conflict with access to information 
measures. However, this means that it is not always essential to the assessment of environmental 
and health risks that information is always disseminated to the public as a whole. Thus where 
there is an argument that such information is not needed by the general public in order for either 
the public or the government to engage in risk assessment and policy formulation, there may be 
no need for public dissemination. 
 
 We may also need to distinguish between knowledge dissemination and the right to use 
such information.  Where there is a need to provide an incentive to disclose there may be a need 
to provide an exclusive right of use – for where we want information volunteered as fully as 
possible. Thus there may be circumstances under which disclosure is appropriate but allowing 
use by the public generally, or competitors specifically, may be inappropriate. However, where 
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such information disclosure is mandated, such a need may be obviated. Nevertheless, such a 
distinction may still be needed where the use that is desired reaches beyond the issues of 
determining government policy or making risk assessments into concerns relating to industrial 
policy. Thus, for example, what role does the rationale for allowing competitors to use 
pharmaceutical test data for generic approval play within the traditional justification for enabling 
access to information?  This requires a separate framework for allowing use, even where 
ensuring disclosure may allow for assessment of health and safety claims. 
 
 Acknowledging there is may be a double interest in disclosure both in the generation and 
dissemination of the information; and in the disclosure to the public for environment and other 
purposes – what is the countervailing interest besides that of the personally harmed firm? What if 
the public interest is specifically about disclosing a harm or risk of harm - to rights in particular, 
such as the harm to the rights of a third party, thus revealing that a firm has indeed been using 
another party’s intellectual property without permission?  Absent criminal concerns, is there a 
need to prevent such self-incrimination? Where the goal of the instrument is to prevent such 
action it cannot be that the very information sought would then be classified as a trade secret or 
CBI. 
 
More directly environmental harms and risks imposed by some actors on others present a 
significant countervailing interest against maintaining a trade secret.  Thus it is crucial that where 
trade secrets are exempted from certain kinds of information disclosure that there is a balancing 
of harms.  However, it is not always the case that such a balancing takes place, especially where 
such an exemption can be unilaterally claimed and cannot be questioned by the government 
receiver of the information, or the requester for the information.75 In particular, if the trade secret 
is specifically about the harm or the risk being imposed rather than any other commercially 
advantageous characteristic of the product or process, can there be any justification for 
maintaining such secrecy other than the fact of reputational harm to the company were such 
information to be released to the public?76 How should this play out where the information about 
the harm is a probability rather than a certainty? What is the appropriate risk calculus between 
the relative certainty of damage to the trade secret holder, and the potential harm that can only be 
confirmed once the information being disclosed has been assessed?  
 
Another issue in trying to resolve the tension between trade secret protection and access 
to information is who should be the one to make a decision about which risks are acceptable to 
take on regarding environmental and health harms. An autonomy approach suggests that 
individuals should have that information77 and make that decision as actors in the market who 
should have complete information about which products and services to purchase.  Where 
damage to the commons is at risk, other actors on the commons have an interest in any risks 
being posed to the commons by other stakeholders. In the absence of a direct legislative act that 
                                                 
75 As Wagner notes, such claims are common in the environmental and health safety arena. See Wendy E. Wagner, 
Commons Ignorance: The Failure of Environmental Law to Produce Needed Information on Health and the 
Environment 53 DUKE L.J. 1619, 1700 (2003-2004). 
76 The core question posed by Mary L. Lyndon, “Trade Secrets and Information Access in Environmental Law” in 
THE LAW AND THEORY OF TRADE SECRECY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 458 (Rochelle C. 
Dreyfuss & Katherine J. Strandburg, eds., 2011). 
77 Mary L. Lyndon Secrecy and Innovation in Tort Law and Regulation 23 N.M. L. Rev. 1, 45 (1993). 
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the information disclosed is not subject to trade secret protection,78 the issue of how to balance 
between trade secret claims and disclosure interests falls to the regulatory agency and to the 
court system, where the public policy interest is determined by the regulatory agency and then 
likely re-balanced or recalibrated by the court.  This presents a significant problem in terms of 
the public policies underlying both trade secret protection and those providing access to 
information. Specifically, in the trade secret context, the evaluation of trade secret viability 
(whether something is a trade secret, whether something should be a trade secret, and whether a 
third party should be allowed to access it due to a doctrinal exception79) is very different in the 
context of disputes between commercial rivals compared to determinations by regulatory 
agencies. As Lyndon points out, regulatory agencies have a very different set of facts before them 
and are not in a position to assess issues around the effectiveness of secrecy measures used to 
maintain the trade secret, nor to assess whether the information submitted is generally known in 
the industry.80  This lack of capacity means that agencies are both ill-suited and reluctant to make 
such determinations themselves and would prefer to leave it to courts to do so.  Even in the case 
of a court, however, absent participation by a commercial rival who has an interest, the 
generation of evidence regarding trade secret validity by the requester of the information is 
always going to be weaker. 
 
 In doing such an assessment, other challenges arise in the context of disclosure of 
information generally. In general, each of these has different scope in the legislative act, in the 
practice and within the constitutional framework in which they operate. For example, whether 
compensation is required depends on a country's rules on whether requiring disclosure of a trade 
secret is tantamount to expropriation that must be compensated. This depends on whether the 
trade secret or CBI is considered an object of property under the national constitutional 
framework.81 If so, it may still be capable of being expropriated, but then the question is whether 
a regulation that requires submission and disclosure of information is tantamount to transferring 
ownership, or destroying ownership and enjoyment of the trade secret.  In the European context, 
for example, intellectual property is established as a fundamental right in the European 
Fundamental Charter of Rights in Article 17(2), in the same way as property in Article 17(1).  
The European Convention on Human Rights has also acknowledged that intellectual property is 
a human right covered under the right to property in Article 1 of the 1st Protocol to the ECHR.82  
What remains under dispute within the European framework is whether undisclosed information, 
in particular trade secrets are objects of property and are protected as intellectual property.  A 
study commissioned by the European Commission has shown that the vast majority of member 
                                                 
78 For examples, see Wendy E. Wagner,Commons Ignorance: The Failure of Environmental Law to Produce Needed 
Information on Health and the Environment 53 DUKE L.J. 1619, 1700 (2003-2004). 
79 Independent derivation, for example. 
80 See Mary L. Lyndon, Secrecy and Innovation in Tort Law and Regulation 23 N.M. L. Rev. 1, 35 (1993). These are 
core criteria in the determination of something is a trade secret under US law. 
81 In the US for example, there is some argument, countered by Lyndon, that the Supreme Court decision in 
Ruckelhaus v Monsanto Co. 467 U.S. 986 (1984), recognized trade secrets as a type of property requiring 
compensation. While the court did establish that there could be a taking of property in a limited sense, this was 
dependent on the creation by the relevant legislation that no disclosure would take place.  In that sense, as I note 
below, the absolute prohibition in Exemption 4 of the US FOIA would seem to create such an expectation and 
disclosure under the FOIA would constitute a taking. See Mary L. Lyndon Secrecy and Innovation in Tort Law 
and Regulation 23 N.M. L. Rev. 1, 8 (1993). 
82 See Dima v. Romania, App. No. 58472/00; Melnychuk v. Ukraine, App. No. 28743/03, Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. 
Portugal, App. No. 73049/01, 45 Eur. H.R. Rep. 36 [8301] (Grand Chamber 2007). 
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states do not protect undisclosed information as intellectual property per se83 but provide 
contract, unfair competition or criminal law protection. The 2016 Directive on the Protection of 
Undisclosed Information84 does not require states to establish trade secrets as IP protection as 
such, but neither does it clearly establish that they are not intellectual property under the broader 
European framework that includes the ECHR. Countries that implement it as a form of 
intellectual property85 may end up triggering the obligations regarding recognition and 
compensation under the ECHR and the Charter on Fundamental Rights.86 However, at the same 
time, recitation 11 of the Directive makes it clear that the protection it provides and harmonizes 
“should not affect the application of Union or national rules that require the disclosure of 
information, including trade secrets, to the public or to public authorities.”87 Article 2 of the 
Directive specifically ensures that existing public disclosure rules are not impacted by the 
directive. 
 
It is important to note that even within this framework of treating intellectual property as 
property, significant and frequent instances of interference with the right to property are allowed. 
In the ECHR several concerns have to be addressed as Helfer88 notes, including “the owner's 
reasonable expectations; imposition of an inequitable or excessive burden; the provision of 
compensation; the uncertainty created by the regulation; and the speed and consistency with 
which the state acts.”89 
  
If these concerns are addressed, then interference with real property has traditionally been 
countenanced. Logically this would extend to the treatment of intellectual property and thus 
states are indeed free to establish interferences for public interest reasons, although the need for 
                                                 
83 Hogan Lovells International LLP Report on Trade Secrets for the European Commission Study on Trade Secrets 
and Parasitic Copying (Look-alikes) MARKT/2010/20/D (2010). 
84 See Directive 2016/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on the Protection of 
Undisclosed Know-how and Business Information (trade secrets) against their unlawful acquisition, use and 
disclosure, 2016 O.J. (L157) 59. Recitation 1 and 2 make a distinction between intellectual property generally and 
trade secrets specifically. 
85 See the example of Italy discussed in Gustavo Ghidni and Valerie Falco “Trade Secrets as Intellectual Property 
Rights: a disgraceful upgrading – Notes on an Italian ‘reform’” in THE LAW AND THEORY OF TRADE SECRECY: A 
HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 140-151 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Katherine J. Strandburg, eds., 
2011). 
86 See Marco Bronckers and Natalie McNelis, Is the EU obliged to improve the protection of trade secrets? An 
inquiry into TRIPS, the European Convention on Human Rights and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
34(10) EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 673 (2012). 
87 Directive 2016/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on the Protection of 
Undisclosed Know-how and Business Information (trade secrets) against their unlawful acquisition, use and 
disclosure, 2016 O.J. (L157) 59. In particular, it references: Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and 
Commission documents (2001 O.J. (L 145) 43; Regulation (EC) No 1367/2006 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 6 September 2006 on the application of the provisions of the Aarhus Convention on Access to 
Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters to 
Community institutions and bodies (2006 O.J. (L 264) 13; Directive 2003/4/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 28 January 2003 on public access to environmental information and repealing Council 
Directive 90/313/EEC (2003 O.J. (L 41) 26. 
88 Laurence Helfer, The New Innovation Frontier? Intellectual Property and the European Court of Human Rights, 
49 HARV. INT’L L. J. 1 (2008). 
89  Laurence Helfer, The New Innovation Frontier? Intellectual Property and the European Court of Human Rights, 
49 HARV. INT’L L. J. 1, 10 (2008). 
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compensation may present an insurmountable barrier for many access to information regulations, 
which is what lies at the heart of most of the conflict between protection of undisclosed 
information and access to information.  A rights-based approach to intellectual property makes it 
very difficult to envision a regulatory action that takes or interferes with a right but that does not 
provide compensation of some reasonable kind, increasing the costs of transparency to the state 
considerably.  The peculiar nature of undisclosed information is exactly that the need for 
disclosure directly destroys the undisclosed nature of the information and thus implicates an 
absolute right so there can rarely be any balancing of harms. 
 
The danger in attempts to resolve the conflict is that a default process is followed where 
such a balancing takes place on a case by case basis rather than through a systematic framework, 
creating a presumption driven by specific policy outcomes and goals.90 This then favors those 
parties with strong personal interests and financial capacity, primarily the parties claiming 
confidentiality.91 How are these tensions to then be resolved?  The examples below point to some 
of the universe of possibilities, both generally and in the specific arena of environmental and 
health information. Looking at examples of general access to information laws and how they 
manage the conflict with commercial information we can point to four experiences of relevance: 
the US Freedom of Information Act; the Indian Right to Information Act; and the European 
framework for access to information. 
 
 
B. Comparative examples of how to resolve the tension between access to environmental 
information and protection of trade secrets: Domestic Examples 
 
 
1. The United States 
 
General FOIA issues in the US turn on the resolution of tension between FOIA and trade 
secret protection as found in Exemption 492, in particular. Exemption 4 notes that the obligations 
to provide public access to information in 5 USC 552(a), do not apply to the list of material 
covered in 552(b). 552(b)(4) states: 
 
“trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged 
or confidential;” 
 
It provides for no exception to this exception. Where the material is deemed trade secret, 
the agency is not required to disclose. However, the language would seem to suggest that it 
remains within the discretion of the agency to disclose it.  The Department of Justice Guide to 
                                                 
90 See Mary L. Lyndon Secrecy and Access in an Innovation Intensive Economy: Reordering Information Privileges 
in Environmental, Health, and Safety Law 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 465, 466 (2007). 
91 See Mary L. Lyndon “Secrecy and Access in an Innovation Intensive Economy: Reordering Information Privileges 
in Environmental, Health, and Safety Law 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 465, 466 (2007). 
92 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (2006), amended by OPEN Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110 175, 121 Stat. 2524; 
23 
the Freedom of Information Act93 notes however that in interaction with the Trade Secrets Act94, 
the discretion of the agency to disclose such information is severely limited.95 As several courts 
have found the exemption and the Trade Secrets Act (TSA) to cover the same subject matter, the 
limitations of the TSA on disclosure of such information apply to agency exercise of its 
discretion under FOIA and Exemption 4. Those obligations subject any such disclosure to fines 
and criminal sanctions96 if carried out improperly and absent a specific legislative mandate to 
allow the release of such information under specific circumstances, the bare language in 
Exemption 4 is insufficient in and of itself to provide a lawful basis for release of trade secret or 
confidential information under the Trade Secrets Act.97 In fact, as the Guide notes and as 
Guidance from the Office of Information Policy98 has noted, a claim of a trade secret covered by 
exemption 4 effectively precludes any disclosure.  This is the only limitation in the US FOIA on 
the discretion of agencies under 552(b) and exists only because of the specific and broad 
prohibition in the Trade Secrets Act.   
 
In terms of coverage, the FOIA Exemption 4 also covers confidential information that has 
the following characteristics: privileged or confidential, obtained from a person and commercial 
or financial.99  Thus it is not limited to trade secrets per se. The determination of whether the 
claimed information qualifies as trade secret is usually assessed minimally by the agency when it 
considers release but this has largely been left to the courts when a requester seeks to challenge 
the release of the information (an impossibility given that the requester does not know the nature 
of the information that they are being denied) or in the context of reverse FOIA claims where the 
agency has determined that it does not qualify as a trade secret or confidential information under 
exemption 4 and the submitter has challenged this finding. The Trade Secrets Act limitation on 
disclosure also applies to this information as well and significant litigation has revolved around 
                                                 
93 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE GUIDE TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (2016) (Exemption 4 
section last updated August 10, 2009). Available at: https://www.justice.gov/oip/doj-guide-freedom-information-
act-0 (last visited August 15, 2016). 
94 As codified at 18 U.S.C.§ 1905 (2006). 
95 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE GUIDE TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 354 (2016) citing CNA 
Fin. Corp. v. Donovan, 830 F.2d 1132, 1144 (D.C. Cir. 1987), Canadian Commercial Corp. v. Dep't of the Air 
Force, 514 F.3d 37, 39 (D.C. Cir. 2008); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. U.S. Dep't of the Air Force, 375 F.3d 1182, 
(D.C. Cir. 2004). 
96 18 U.S. C. § 1905 (2006) – Disclosure of Confidential Information Generally - whoever, being an officer or 
employee of the United States or of any department or agency thereof, any person acting on behalf of the federal 
housing finance agency, or agent of the Department of Justice as defined in the Antitrust Civil Process Act (15 u.s.c. 
1311–1314), or being an employee of a private sector organization who is or was assigned to an agency 
under Chapter 37 of title 5, publishes, divulges, discloses, or makes known in any manner or to any extent not 
authorized by law any information coming to him in the course of his employment or official duties or by reason of 
any examination or investigation made by, or return, report or record made to or filed with, such department or 
agency or officer or employee thereof, which information concerns or relates to the trade secrets, processes, 
operations, style of work, or apparatus, or to the identity, confidential statistical data, amount or source of any 
income, profits, losses, or expenditures of any person, firm, partnership, corporation, or association; or permits any 
income return or copy thereof or any book containing any abstract or particulars thereof to be seen or examined by 
any person except as provided by law; shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; 
and shall be removed from office or employment. 
97 Bartholdi Cable Co. v. FCC, 114 F.3d 274, 281 (D.C. Cir. 1997); CNA Fin. Corp. v. Donovan, 830 F.2d 1132, 
1144 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
98 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE GUIDE TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 356 (2016) and FOIA 
Update, Vol. VI, No. 3, at 3 ("OIP Guidance: Discretionary Disclosure and Exemption 4") 
99 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (2006), amended by OPEN Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110 175, 121 Stat. 2524; 
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when and how information falls within this framework.  Of key concern is the distinction that the 
line of cases100 makes between expectations of confidentiality of information voluntarily 
submitted to the government and of information required to be submitted. From National 
Parks101, the key determinant of confidentiality is whether: “disclosure of the information is likely 
(1) to impair the Government's ability to obtain necessary information in the future; or (2) to cause 
substantial harm to the competitive position of the person from whom the information was 
obtained.”102 While the first prong remains in operation, the majority of cases, as the Guide points 
out, are on the second prong.103  The key point here is that the harm is that from action by 
competitors, therefore use of access by competitors rather than generalized harm in the market. This 
has been a case by case, extremely fact dependent analysis by courts. Most importantly, courts have 
rejected any additional public policy balancing in this analysis.104 
The Critical Mass decision limited the National Parks framework to information required to be 
submitted to the government, under which the expectation of confidentiality would be somewhat less, 
and some releases envisioned and created a new standard for information voluntarily submitted, for 
which the expectation of confidentiality would be higher. Thus only if it was “"customarily" 
disclosed to the public by the submitter”105 would it be subject to release under Exemption 4.  This 
suggests that, to the extent that a submitter has a legitimate expectation of confidentiality, no releases 
of information are allowed under either part of Exemption 4. Thus under FOIA, the balance of 
justification falls in favor of CBI protection even where the basis of the law is the interest in self-
governance. The interest in trade secret health and safety information, including as it relates to the 
environment, is therefore something that has generally taken place outside the FOIA framework. 
Several pieces of US legislation simply exclude health and safety information from being 
claimed as trade secret.   
 
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)106 requires government disclosure of both 
environmental impacts and the process for reaching decisions relating to those environmental 
impacts. It places no limitation on any disclosure of trade secrets within this process and so any 
federal action that relies on data or information for its environmental impact statement would 
nominally be allowed to disclose except that, again, in interaction with the Trade Secrets Act107 
such disclosure would likely be prohibited.  Unlike the FOIA there is no explicit exemption, but 
there is neither an explicit authorization in the law for such disclosure which would comply more 
clearly with the TSA requirement.  In any case, the federal government views its disclosure 
                                                 
100 Most importantly National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Morton 498 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1974) and Critical 
Mass Energy Project v. NRC 931 F.2d 939 (D.C. Cir.) (Randolph & Williams, JJ. concurring), vacated & rehearing 
en banc granted, 942 F.2d 799 (D.C. Cir. 1991), grant of summary judgment to agency affirmed en banc, 975 F.2d 
871 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
101 National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Morton 498 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1974) 
102 National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Morton 498 F.2d 765, 770 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
103 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE GUIDE TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 305 (2016) 
104 Public Citizen Health Research Group v. FDA 704 F.2d 1280, 1288 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
105 Critical Mass, 975 F.2d at 879. 
106 42 U.S.C 4332(2)(C) 
107 Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C.§ 1905 (2006) 
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requirements under the NEPA through the lens of FOIA and thus brings most of its disclosure 
obligations under NEPA under the FOIA framework.108  
 
Under the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (ECPRA)109 in the context 
of emergency planning and response, the government requires firms to disclose any discharges of 
hazardous chemical substances above a certain threshold, as well as amounts of such chemicals 
stored.110 This information must be released to local authorities and states.111  The federal 
government is also required to maintain and provide public access to a Toxics Release 
Inventory(TRI)112 based on this information. This must identify the chemicals, the quantities in 
which they are used or released as well as methods of storage and disposal. However, the 
location of Tier 2113 information may be withheld from disclosure at the request of the 
submitter.114 Tier 2 information is more detailed than Tier 1115 information which only describes 
the chemicals in aggregate terms and categories of hazard rather than specific chemical name, or 
use. Tier 2 information is also only required to be submitted to state and local authorities on 
request116 and its availability to the public is relatively restricted.117 Where state and local 
authorities have the information in hand they are required to disclose it to a requester and if not, 
they are required to request it from the firm, where the amount of chemicals stored is above 
10,000 pounds.118 Below that threshold, disclosure is discretionary on the part of state and local 
authorities and must be justified by the requester. ECPRA also protects trade secrets from 
disclosure.119 Thus a firm can designate the specific chemical identity of the chemicals it uses 
and stores as a trade secret and is not required to submit it. Instead it can provide “the generic 
class or category of the hazardous chemical, extremely hazardous substance, or toxic chemical 
                                                 
108 Council on Environmental Quality FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT HANDBOOK 1 (2014) Available at: 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ceq/foia_handbook_2-27-12.pdf  
109 Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050 (2006)). 
110 42 U.S.C. § 11002. 
111 42 U.S.C. § 11003. 
112 42 U.S.C. § 11023(h), 11044. 
113 42 U.S.C. § 11022(d)(2). 
114 See 42 U.S.C § 11044(a). Tier 2 information is the following:  
(A) The chemical name or the common name of the chemical as provided on the material safety data sheet. 
(B) An estimate (in ranges) of the maximum amount of the hazardous chemical present at the facility at any time 
during the preceding calendar year. 
(C) An estimate (in ranges) of the average daily amount of the hazardous chemical present at the facility during the 
preceding calendar year. 
(D) A brief description of the manner of storage of the hazardous chemical. 
(E) The location at the facility of the hazardous chemical. 
(F) An indication of whether the owner elects to withhold location information of a specific hazardous chemical 
from disclosure to the public under section 11044 of this title. 
115 42 U.S.C. § 11022(d)(1). This covers:  
(i) An estimate (in ranges) of the maximum amount of hazardous chemicals in each category present at the facility at 
any time during the preceding calendar year. 
(ii) An estimate (in ranges) of the average daily amount of hazardous chemicals in each category present at the 
facility during the preceding calendar year. 
(iii) The general location of hazardous chemicals in each category. 
116 42 U.S.C. § 11022(d)(2) 
117 42 U.S.C. § 11022(e)(3) 
118 42 U.S.C. § 11022(e)(3)(B) 
119 42 U.S.C. § 11042 
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(as the case may be).”120 Determination of whether a trade secret is validly claimed is at the 
discretion of the Administrator designated under the Act.121 The determination that something is 
a trade secret can be reviewed on request122 and is subject to judicial review. The same is true for 
the trade secret claimant.123  ECPRA also explicitly limits disclosure by making it subject to the 
Trade Secrets Act.124 Thus, much like FOIA, ECPRA envisions no release of trade secrets. This 
makes it difficult for requesters to challenge in court given that challenging the existence of a 
trade secret requires knowledge of what the trade secret actually is and what measures the firm 
has taken (information which is in the hands of the firm and not the requester.) The limitations 
are somewhat attenuated by the obligation on the local, state, or federal authorities to provide, 
where known, information on known adverse effects or toxicity of chemicals claimed to be trade 
secret to any requester.125 As both Roesler126 and Wagner127 point out, it is the very lack of such 
information that should drive disclosure of the chemical names and identities given that the vast 
majority of chemicals in use in industry have no such information developed about them. 
 
While useful for emergency planning, the ECPRA and the associated TRI (along with high 
thresholds for reporting and associated exemptions) have generally not provided the kind of 
specific information that the public would consider necessary to make determinations about 
actual health risks and toxicity, nor has it enabled the development of knowledge and scientific 
information about specific chemicals and their risks.128 
 
2. India 
  
The Indian Right to Information Act (RIA)129 is one of the more extensive FOIA-like 
structures out there with regional and national information commissions and commissioners, 
independent of the government to whom appeals may be made for refusals. In looking at the 
grounds for refusal in the Indian RIA, the issue of confidential information is addressed in 
Article 8(1)(d) of Chapter II. That states that there shall be no obligation to provide: 
 
“information including commercial confidence, trade secrets or intellectual property, the 
disclosure of which would harm the competitive position of a third party, unless the 
competent authority is satisfied that the larger public interest warrants the disclosure of such 
information;” 
  
                                                 
120 42 U.S.C. § 11042(a)(1)(B) 
121 42 U.S.C. § 11042(a)(3) 
122 42 U.S.C. § 11042(d) 
123 42 U.S.C. § 11042(d) 
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128 See Shannon M. Roesler, The Nature of the Environmental Right to Know 39 ECOLOGY L.Q. 989, 1019, 1023 
(2012). 
129 Right to Information Act (2005) (Act No. 22 of 2005 as modified up to 1st of February 2011.) (India) 
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Thus under the RIA, publication is still possible based on a weighing of the public interest. 
There is very little available case law on how this has been interpreted and managed, but at a 
minimum a balancing exercise seems to be mandated. At least one court has dealt with 
interpreting Article 8(1)(d)130 in a case that dealt with documents submitted in a tender by private 
parties to carry out consulting work for the state. The court in that case gave great weight to the 
object and purpose of the Act in ensuring access to public information and scrutiny of public 
acts. In particular, the court noted the need for special scrutiny of commercially significant 
public acts131 as implicating the very dangers that the act was meant to address i.e. secrecy 
relating to public funds and possible corruption. The court noted that once a decision was made 
regarding a tender, the public had a right to know the basis of the decision and thus documents 
submitted in order to win the tender must of necessity be made available to allow the public to 
perform its scrutiny function.132 The court also saw no justifiable countervailing interest on the 
part of the private actor claiming confidentiality as participating in tenders was a voluntary 
process. The court ruled that the information did not fall within the exemption of article 8.1(d).  
Thus the key distinction in the India case, was the fact that participation in the market for tenders 
was voluntary and not a necessity for firm. To the submission that participation was necessary to 
participate in the firm’s sector at all, the court provided little guidance, but is seems that the 
court’s rationale would not extend to such cases. 
 
 
3. The European Union 
 
The EU Transparency Regulation makes the refusal to disclose mandatory in the case of 
confidential information, subject only to an over-riding public interest, and in any case subject to 
consultation with the private party submitter of the information.133 Historically, the EU bodies 
have been deferential to refusals by third parties to allow disclosure.134 
  
In the environmental arena, the defining access to information regulation in the EU is 
based on the implementation of the Aarhus Convention.135 The Aarhus Convention is the primary 
international/regional instrument framing the direct right to access information on environmental 
matters and both the European Union and all of its member states are parties to it. As a primarily 
European instrument to which the EU as an institution is also a signatory, the case law of the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) (now the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)) is key 
to its implementation.  For our purposes, it is important to understand the triggers for when 
information falls under the Aarhus Convention and then what framework the Convention 
provides for the protection of trade secrets and confidential information if any.  
                                                 
130 State of Jharkhand and Another. vs Navin Kumar Sinhga and Another on 8 August, 2007, All India Reporter 
2008 Jhar 19, 2007 (3) Jharkand Cases Reporter 668. 
131 Citing the Indian Supreme Court decision in The State of Uttar Pradesh v. Raj Narain and Others. 
 All India Reporter 1975 Supreme Court S65  
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The rationale for the treaty is very clear and is embodied in the preambles and the objective in 
Article 1: 
“In order to contribute to the protection of the right of every person of present and future 
generations to live in an environment adequate to his or her health and well-being, each 
Party shall guarantee the rights of access to information, public participation in decision-
making, and access to justice in environmental matters in accordance with the provisions 
of this Convention.” 
 
 Thus access to information here reflects not just a utilitarian function but is seen as a 
contribution to the right of each and every person, present and future to a healthy environment. 
This is fundamental as it frames access to information as a human right, rather than simply as a 
means to an end.  This is in line with broader human rights jurisprudence on the freedom of 
expression that notes that access to information is a primary element of the right to engage in 
free expression and participate in the democratic process.136 
 
 Regarding the trigger for action, Article 2(3) defines the very broad scope of what 
constitutes environmental information subject to disclosure: 
 
“Environmental information” means any information in written, visual, aural, electronic 
or any other material form on: 
(a) The state of elements of the environment, such as air and atmosphere, water, soil, 
land, landscape and natural sites, biological diversity and its components, including 
genetically modified organisms, and the interaction among these elements; 
(b) Factors, such as substances, energy, noise and radiation, and activities or measures, 
including administrative measures, environmental agreements, policies, legislation, plans 
and programmes, affecting or likely to affect the elements of the environment within the 
scope of subparagraph (a) above, and cost-benefit and other economic analyses and 
assumptions used in environmental decision-making; 
(c) The state of human health and safety, conditions of human life, cultural sites and built 
structures, inasmuch as they are or may be affected by the state of the elements of the 
environment or, through these elements, by the factors, activities or measures referred to 
in subparagraph (b) above; 
 
This is generally not read to include information on pharmaceutical products, particularly new 
chemical entities (NCEs). In Article 2(5) a broad definition of what constitutes the public is also 
used. Article 4, imposes an obligation to provide information upon request. States may not 
impose a standing requirement or require an interest to be stated.   
 
 There are circumstances under which such a request may be refused outlined in Article 
4(4) if they would have an adverse effect. In particular, we are concerned here with the 
exceptions in 4(4)(d) –(g): 
                                                 
136 See e.g. Leander v. Sweden, Merits, App no 9248/81, A/116, (1987) 9 EHRR 433, IHRL 69 (ECHR 1987), 26th 
March 1987, European Court of Human Rights [ECtHR]; Lingens v. Austria, App No 9815/82, Case No 
12/1984/84/131, A/103, [1986] ECHR 7, (1986) 8 EHRR 103, (1986) 8 EHRR 407, IHRL 58 (ECHR 1986), 8th 
July 1986, European Court of Human Rights [ECtHR];  
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(d) The confidentiality of commercial and industrial information, where such 
confidentiality is protected by law in order to protect a legitimate economic interest. 
Within this framework, information on emissions which is relevant for the protection of 
the environment shall (my emphasis) be disclosed; 
(e) Intellectual property rights; 
(f) The confidentiality of personal data and/or files relating to a natural person where that 
person has not consented to the disclosure of the information to the public, where such 
confidentiality is provided for in national law; 
(g) The interests of a third party which has supplied the information requested without 
that party being under or capable of being put under a legal obligation to do so, and 
where that party does not consent to the release of the material; 
 
First, generally, the exclusions are discretionary and are to be decided by the public authority. 
They are not mandatory, nor do they require the consent of third parties if the government 
nevertheless determines either on a case by case basis, or on a broader basis that disclosure is 
appropriate. In addition, the final paragraph of article 4 notes that these exceptions should be 
construed narrowly, given the strong public interest in access to the information, especially 
where it may address emissions to the environment: 
 
The aforementioned grounds for refusal shall be interpreted in a restrictive way, taking 
into account the public interest served by disclosure and taking into account whether the 
information requested relates to emissions into the environment. 
 
 This more broadly reflects the rationale and conviction that trade secrets should not 
protect those responsible for engaging in potentially harmful behavior from claiming information 
about that behavior as confidential or trade secret. The Aarhus Convention Implementation 
Guide also notes that restrictive treatment implies a higher burden of proof in order to exercise 
the discretion to refuse such as: showing of actual harm from the release rather than the mere 
possibility thereof137, including that the harm cannot be remedied by other compensatory 
mechanisms. The existence of the harm may still be countenanced as long as the adverse effect is 
not so severe when balanced against the existence of the right, or against, as the implementation 
guide notes, the public interest in disclosure. Thus some measure of adverse effect must be 
allowed when weighed against strong interests in disclosure.138 The weaker the public interest 
the easier it may be to invoke the exceptions.  
 
 Looking specifically at the exceptions, Article 4(4)(d) expresses the paradigmatic concern 
over the disclosure of trade secrets or CBI. Such information must however be explicitly stated 
and protected by law139 as trade secrets or undisclosed information in some fashion.  Where such 
information is protected under different systems such as unfair competition, it remains unclear 
whether that would reach the threshold under the convention as ‘protected by law’. The 
                                                 
137 UNECE, THE AARHUS CONVENTION – AN IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE 90 Second Edition (2014). 
138  “Thus, in situations where there is a significant public interest in disclosure of certain environmental information 
and a relatively small amount of harm to the interests involved, the Convention would require disclosure.” European 
Community ACCC/C/2007/21, ECE/MP.PP/C.1/2009/2/Add.1, 11 December 2009, para. 30) 
139 See UNECE, THE AARHUS CONVENTION – AN IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE 88 Second Edition (2014). 
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implementation guide argues that the protection must be explicitly as commercial or industrial 
secrets140, meaning that normal unfair competition law protection may not qualify as such. As 
stated, it appears quite broad and foresees a relatively deferential approach. That said, the 
authority will have to assess the legitimacy of the economic interest claimed (thus to some extent 
the validity of the information as a trade secret or as CBI). As with other international treaties, 
legitimacy has both an economic and normative framework suggesting already that legitimacy 
must be examined in the context of legitimate claims by others to that same information. In 
addition, it makes clear that no such claim can be made regarding undisclosed information 
related to emissions into the environment. This reflects the absolute barrier that Aarhus presents 
to confidentiality claims related to information regarding environmental harms. 
 
Article 4(4)(e) presents a puzzling claim except perhaps to address the lacuna where trade 
secrets in particular are treated as intellectual property. If so, it seems to impinge on the scope of 
article 4(4)(d).  If it refers to other intellectual property rights then a category mistake seems to 
have been made as all other such rights must by definition involve disclosure to the public in 
order for such a right/grant to exist in the first place. However, the implementation guide points 
to copyright claims as a possible barrier to disclosure where an author may wish to prevent 
dissemination of a work, such as a study or report.141  It also points to a decision by the 
compliance committee that such claims should not prevent disclosure of documents created 
specifically for public purposes such as environmental impact assessments.142 
 
 Article 4(4)(f) relates to personal information which is protected under privacy and data 
protection regimes and impinge upon core personal autonomy rights. It is however, limited only 
to natural persons.  
 
 Finally, Article 4(4)(g) reflects one of the other rationales discussed above, that in order 
for a state to encourage voluntary submission of environmental information for its own 
regulatory processes, it may limit disclosure.  This article is a clear expression of that claim, the 
utility of which, as I noted above, may not always be as clear, given the structural incentives of 
market actors. 
 
 The discretion to agree to disclose is absolute under the convention and expressly does 
not allow for third parties to object to its release,143 but the discretion to refuse to disclose is 
restricted by a requirement of justification under article 4(7) and the obligation to make available 
a review procedure under Article 9.  Such a review must be conducted by a body independent of 
the public authority and should be judicial or quasi-judicial. Where it is judicial, an intermediate 
review body should also be available for expedited, cost-effective decisions. The procedure does 
not require the participation of the affected third parties or submitters of information under 
Article 4(4). 
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143 ECE/MP.PP/C.1/2009/2/Add.1 (Findings with regard to communication ACCC/C/2007/21 concerning 
compliance by the European Community), para. 31 (b). 
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Importantly, the Aarhus Convention imposes not just a right to access information but 
imposes several positive obligations for the public authorities to engage in disclosure of specific 
kinds of information even absent requests to do so in Article 5(7) but still subject to the 
discretion to refuse to disclose information covered in article 4(4). 
 
 The implementation of these rules in national law has varied.144 At the national level of 
course, the directions on how to address trade secrets and undisclosed information above have 
been very specific. Article 3(1) does mandate states to ensure the compatibility of other 
provisions of law with the convention and to alter those incompatible laws. While not creating a 
hierarchy, this does specify that laws inconsistent with the obligation must be harmonized or 
justified and that the Convention must nevertheless be made effective and incompatibilities 
removed or adjusted for while engaging in the proper public interest balancing mandated by the 
Convention. 
 
The Aarhus Convention has been implemented by the member states of European Union 
as has the EU itself, as well as the European Economic Area countries (including Norway and 
Switzerland).  The interpretations of the compliance committee and the implementation guide 
have significantly framed the implementation of the Aarhus Convention.  In the EU, 
implementation took place through the Aarhus Regulation145  as well as in the Environmental 
Information Directive.146 In that context they have also had to deal with claims of confidentiality 
and when to disclose such information and to determine how the Aarhus Convention should 
relate to other access to information legislation in the EU such as the Transparency Regulation.147 
Most significantly, the Aarhus Regulation applies the Transparency Regulation to environmental 
information.148 In addressing the Transparency Regulation's treatment of confidential 
information, the Aarhus regulation, Article 6(1) shifts the traditionally restrictive approach to one 
that is more broadly favorable to release of information.  Thus environmental information 
relating to emissions is defined as coming under the over-riding public interest necessary for the 
release of confidential information in the Transparency Regulation.   
 
In addition, the other grounds for refusal in the Transparency Regulation will be 
interpreted restrictively according to the Aarhus Convention.  The Aarhus Convention does not 
establish a requirement that the concerned third party be consulted or have a right of review as in 
reverse FOIA-type frameworks, but the continuing applicability of the Transparency Regulation 
means that Article 4.4 still applies and consulting with the concerned third party is required even 
for environmental information. One recent case dealt directly with this issue, regarding a request 
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for access to testing data and production methods submitted by firms seeking market entry of 
glyphosphate into the EU. The Commission had refused to release the documents based on 
concerns that intellectual property and trade secrets would be disclosed.149  The case revolved 
around the mandatory disclosure element that required information relating to emissions to be 
disclosed in which the Commission argued that part of the information on methods and identity 
of the impurities and products was not related to emissions and was therefore not an over-riding 
interest under the Transparency Regulation.150 The Court ruled against the Commission arguing 
that the Aarhus regulation overruled and governed any other measures in any directive or 
regulation if it related to environmental information related to emissions.151 In addressing the 
relationship of the Aarhus Regulation to the EU Fundamental Charter of Rights and the ECHR 
on property, the Court essentially argued that the Aarhus Regulation is not in contradiction to 
these, especially given how clearly and unequivocally the Regulation addresses the balance 
between the public interest and the right to property in its text.152  The decision has raised 
concerns that it fundamentally changes the expectations of firms submitting confidential 
information for marketing approval.153 However, given the clarity of purpose of the Aarhus 
Convention, this very outcome was foreseen and intended by the drafters of the treaty and the 
regulation. Whereas all access to information regulations in the EU had previously been 
submitted to the Transparency Regulation, the Aarhus Regulation made the Transparency 
Regulation subsidiary in the specific case of environmental information.  Thus much of the 
debate now in the EU will largely revolve around what is environmental information, and what is 
information that relates to emissions into the environment with reference to practice in the 
Aarhus Compliance Committee.   
 
5. Conclusion 
 
While significant similarities exist among the different states, it is clear that the main 
vector that they differ on in resolving the conflict between trade secret protection and access is 
the extent to which the prohibition on disclosure of trade secrets is absolute.  In the US, it 
appears absolute in the context of the FOIA.  However, where a statute explicitly requires 
disclosure in a specific case as part of a regulatory framework, neither the FOIA nor the Trade 
Secrets Act appear to be barriers.  Most importantly while the FOIA creates an expectation of 
non-disclosure, specific regulatory acts that explicitly require disclosure do not do so.  
 
The EU, as a general rule does not envision disclosure of trade secrets, unless an 
overriding public interest can be found, and has a specific and overriding obligation to disclose 
for information related to ‘emissions into the environment”.  Thus for environmental information 
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the EU creates no expectation of non-disclosure and for other information more generally, the 
explicit rule is that the disclosure may be allowed when there is an overriding public interest. 
 
In contrast to these, the Indian FOIA makes it clear that where a larger public interest is 
identified, the FOIA authority may, at its discretion disclose the information.  Thus for all 
information there is an explicit statement in the law that there can be no expectation of non-
disclosure as the claim will always be balanced against the larger interest. The Indian approach 
constitutes the broadest approach, although, within the narrow scope of environmental 
information, the Aarhus Convention may be stronger in requiring disclosure. 
 
In none of the cases, does it appear that the legislation provides for an expectation of non-
disclosure by excluding trade secrets from the scope of the FOIA, and the regulatory authority or 
the courts have nevertheless carried out a balancing against the public interest in deciding 
whether or not to disclose trade secret information.  There is no reason in principle that the 
authorities or the bodies should refrain from carrying out such balancing.  To a significant extent, 
while the FOIAs represent and make explicit most of the rationales for access to information, in 
and of themselves they are not a complete reflection of the public policy bargain regarding the 
tension between access to information and protection of undisclosed information.  The FOIA 
itself is not the place where specific interests, especially those relating to health and environment 
are articulated.  These are usually articulated in separate legislation within the constitutional 
framework and are considered sufficient means of protection which are taken into account by 
other legislation.  The inclusion of trade secrets in most FOIA legislation is therefore a means of 
preventing automatic disclosure of such information but is not itself sufficient as a total 
prohibition against balancing the trade secret interests against other interest expressed within the 
broader legislative and constitutional framework.  The claim of trade secret protection, in the 
access to information framework is, conceptually, the beginning of the analysis, not the end.  
This can be seen in the US where the strengthening of the prohibition on disclosure of trade 
secrets came from interaction with another legislative act, the Trade Secrets Act, rather than a 
specific amendment and addition to the FOIA. The informational interests protected by the FOIA 
were always intended to interact with the interests in other legislation.  There is nothing, 
therefore, that should, in principle prevent states form carrying out such balancing. However, the 
very fact of the creation of an expectation of non-disclosure is something that, under the TRIPS 
Agreement, forecloses the possibility of such balancing and thus may require more explicit and 
detailed statements regarding the manner in which public interests may, if at all, be balanced 
against trade secret interests in the FOIA context in implementing legislation.  The next section 
details how and why this may be the case. 
 
 
III.  
TO WHAT EXTENT DO TRIPS AND TRIPS-PLUS REGIMES LIMIT THE UNIVERSE OF APPROACHES TO 
RESOLVING THE TENSION BETWEEN ACCESS TO INFORMATION AND PROTECTION OF TRADE 
SECRETS? 
 
A. The TRIPS Agreement 
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1. The Nature and Scope of Protection in Article 39 
 
The TRIPS Agreement is the primary international set of rules for the protection of trade 
secrets and undisclosed information.  It incorporates the previous major international treaty on 
the same subject matter, the Paris Convention on Industrial Property.154  In addition, in the period 
following the TRIPS Agreement, many countries have signed onto bilateral and regional free 
trade agreements with more extensive protections for trade secrets and undisclosed information. 
In the TRIPS Agreement, the rule for protection of undisclosed information can be found in 
Article 39.  
 
Article 39(1) states: 
1. In the course of ensuring effective protection against unfair competition as provided in 
Article 10bis of the Paris Convention (1967), Members shall protect undisclosed 
information in accordance with paragraph 2 and data submitted to governments or 
governmental agencies in accordance with paragraph 3. 
Paragraph 1 requires governments to protect such information against three core acts identified 
in the Paris Convention: false allegation, confusion, and misleading statements regarding quality, 
source, processes, and manufacturing. In the final case, the aim of the Paris Convention may 
have been to try and prevent the use of statements regarding equivalence and source e.g. that 
generic medicines come from the same source to the branded protected medicines. The Paris 
Convention only protected against use but not disclosure. In contrast, the TRIPS Agreement 
states in Article 39(2): 
2. Natural and legal persons shall have the possibility of preventing information lawfully 
within their control from being disclosed to, acquired by, or used by others without their 
consent in a manner contrary to honest commercial practices (10) so long as such 
information: 
(a) is secret in the sense that it is not, as a body or in the precise configuration and 
assembly of its components, generally known among or readily accessible to persons 
within the circles that normally deal with the kind of information in question;    
(b) has commercial value because it is secret; and    
(c) has been subject to reasonable steps under the circumstances, by the person lawfully 
in control of the information, to keep it secret. 
 
This is the paragraph that adopts the current framing in most jurisdictions ( and primarily 
drawn from the US Uniform Trade Secrets Act) regarding protection of trade secrets. It requires 
all member states to provide protection not simply against use but also against disclosure. It also 
embodies a softer requirement that continues to protect the information even if it is known to 
                                                 
154 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of March 20, 1883, as revised at Brussels on December 
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some in the field as long as it is not 'generally' known. In addition, the footnote provides even 
more detail noting that: 
 
 “For the purpose of this provision, “a manner contrary to honest commercial 
practices” shall mean at least practices such as breach of contract, breach of confidence 
and inducement to breach, and includes the acquisition of undisclosed information by 
third parties who knew, or were grossly negligent in failing to know, that such practices 
were involved in the acquisition.”  
 
This expands the scope of covered activities beyond the list identified in the Paris 
Convention, as referenced in Article 39.1.  
 
The manner of implementing such protection is not addressed but left up to states, as long 
as it is at least based in unfair competition law as defined by the Paris Convention and Footnote 
10 of Article 39.2.  This reflects the basic viewpoint of the majority of states at the time of 
signing the TRIPS Agreement that trade secrets were not objects of property in the same way as 
traditional intellectual property. There is some argument, most notably from Bronckers and 
McNelis155, that TRIPS actually requires that trade secrets be protected as intellectual property 
and not simply through unfair competition law. They argue that to provide protection through 
unfair competition law would be to negate the meaning of Article 39.2 since article 10bis of the 
Paris Convention is not intended to provide protection for trade secrets. A counter to their 
argument is that article 39.2 is meant to create precisely that link between unfair competition law 
and trade secrets that the Paris Convention failed to do and that the aim was to justify being able 
to place these further rights and restrictions in the TRIPS Agreement. Without reference to the 
Paris Convention, the article 39 obligations would have been sui generis for most states, in a 
similar way that obligations on geographical indications were. Treating trade secrets as 
intellectual property would then bring them under the protection of the European Convention on 
Human Rights and the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, which would require 
compensation for any disclosure or use, a key conclusion of Bronckers' and Mcnelis' paper. 
 
 Article 39.2 is crucial in several respects.  It classifies any and all such information as 
trade secrets, with no exceptions, or subject matter exclusions.  This means that no information 
may be excluded from the ambit of trade secret protection as long as it meets these essential 
criteria. Article 39.2 is broader than Article 39.3 which covers only information submitted to 
governments and only information submitted for marketing approval of pharmaceutical and 
agricultural new chemical entities.  Article 39 as a whole and the TRIPS Agreement generally 
have no directly applicable exceptions that would allow for interferences with the right to 
prevent disclosure, acquisition or use. Thus the only limitation on the right in Article 39.2 is the 
extent to which the action by the government which resulted in disclosure, acquisition or use was 
contrary to honest commercial practices.  The disclosure by a government of submitted 
information (not covered by Article 39.3) is therefore dependent on whether we can argue that 
such disclosure of such information would not be contrary to honest practices.  
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The possibility to prevent disclosure does not, at first glance, seem to encompass action 
by the government to use, or to require submission of trade secret information.  Thus the 
possibility to prevent acquisition by others does not necessarily extend to the possibility to 
prevent the government from requiring submission of the information, or from using or 
disclosing the information itself, provided it was not acting as a commercial actor or in breach of 
contract or confidence. There may however, be an argument that the right does extend to the 
government itself, where the actions of the government can be characterized as acting in a 
manner contrary to honest commercial practices i.e. as engaging in unfair competition. As such, 
if the government were to act as a commercial actor capable of engaging in the four behaviors 
outlined in footnote 10: 
 breach of contract 
 breach of confidence 
 inducement to breach 
 acquisition by third parties who know, or were grossly negligent in failing to know, that 
such practices were involved in the acquisition 
then a claim could be made that, not only was the state was not in compliance with its 
obligations under the TRIPS Agreement, but that under national law it could be sued as a violator 
of the rights itself.  Thus, for information, beyond the scope of pharmaceutical and agricultural 
test and other data necessary for marketing approval (see article 39.3) Article 39.2 is still very 
much relevant as a potential limitation to disclosure specifically. One can only conclude that 
Article 39.2 places an absolute barrier to use or disclosure where such disclosure entails one of 
the breaches above. 
 
For the government to justify such action only three avenues would be allowed since simply 
stating a public justification would not seem to be available under the TRIPS Agreement: 
 
1. that the government cannot be a commercial actor capable of unfair competition or 
dishonest commercial practices 
2. that the government in the specific case is not acting as a commercial actor in the 
specific sector 
3. that the government can sometimes be considered a commercial actor but that the 
specific circumstances of the legislation authorizing disclosure are such that the 
government owes no duty with respect to breach of contract, breach of confidence or 
the other factors. 
 
The first is fundamentally incoherent given the role that governments play in commerce and 
contracts, especially in the sphere of procurement. Additionally, the language of Article 39.2 
does not per se exclude governments from the ambit of the provision.  Natural and legal persons 
can exclude “others”, not just third parties. The second one looks to the specific role that the 
information disclosure legislation requires the government to play. As a regulator that perhaps 
defines market entry, those clear circumstances may allow an argument that a regulator is a 
market definer rather than a market participant and thus cannot act as a commercial actor. Thus 
where the reason for the disclosure is that the legislation specifically excludes certain categories 
of information from such protection, in the service of some other government public purpose, or 
in the service of creating a market e.g. in the case of government procurement through tenders, it 
would not be covered. However this reasoning is somewhat circular as by definition under the 
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provision, the actions that are considered dishonest practices are those outlined.  Thus it is not 
the ‘commercial’ nature of the act with which the provision concerns itself but the breach itself, 
which defines the ‘commerciality’.  It is not unreasonable that where the government engages in 
one of these breaches it would be considered to be violating the provision and subject to 
complaints by other countries that they were not meeting their TRIPS obligations.  
 
Thus we are left with the third option. This is based on the understanding that the existence 
of a contract, or the existence of a confidence, creates a legitimate expectation that information 
will not be disclosed and if such information is disclosed then there is a violation. This leaves no 
real room for justification by reference to public policy, as the existence of breaches itself 
provides what seems to be strict liability, at least within the TRIPS framework.  I argue that this 
does however leave room for legislative action that does NOT create such an expectation of 
confidence when information is submitted or is required to be submitted. Legislation that by 
definition ensures that it creates no expectation of contractual rights, or rights relating to 
confidence in the information submitted would fall outside the ambit of Article 39.2 because it 
would not create an expectation. This is important because, under TRIPS, the trade secret 
protection is triggered by one of the breaches.  Even where the requirements for qualifying as a 
trade secret are met (Article 39.2a-c), the ability to prevent use, disclosure or acquisition is 
limited by those occurring through dishonest practices i.e. one of the breaches in footnote 10.  
The expectation of confidentiality is not created by the coming into existence of the trade secret 
but by the existence of an obligation on the part of the acquirer to keep it secret, therefore 
creating a legitimate expectation on the part of the trade secret holder. Appropriate legislation 
that either entirely excludes a category of information from trade secret protection for specific 
purposes or that allows for trade secret protection to be balanced against the public interest 
would not be in violation of the TRIPS standard. However, this still leaves the disclosure through 
specific exceptions under each law in danger. Where the exception simply states that information 
protected as trade secrets will not be disclosed, absent an explicit counter-statement that this will 
be balanced against any over-riding public policy interest, it will be difficult to avoid the creation 
of an expectation that the information will be held in confidence, or some quasi-contractual 
expectation that this is the case.  So for FOIAs that do not ensure that public policy justifications 
are formally and explicitly counter-balanced against claims of trade secrecy, any disclosure under 
such legislation would fall afoul of the requirements of Article 39.2 for protection of trade 
secrets. This would therefore have the same effect on a FOIA provision as the US Trade Secrets 
Act does in the US: preventing any disclosure of a trade secret by a government agency. 
 
The absence of an exception to Article 39.2, even for the public interest,156 means that there 
is a significant possibility that many states are not in compliance with their TRIPS obligations, at 
least outside the ambit of marketing approval for pharmaceutical and agricultural products. Even 
where this is not the case, it implicates the means by which they will implement their obligations 
under newly signed international environmental treaties which both require submission of 
information to state and international institutions but also provide for unqualified exemptions for 
trade secrets.  Many of these seem to have been adopted with the presumption that some type of 
                                                 
156 There is a possibility of using Article 7 and 8 a broad justification for public interest measures in TRIPS but as I 
point out in Chapter 6, Dalindyebo Shabalala Climate Change, Technology Transfer and Intellectual Property: 
Options for Action at the UNFCCC (2014), current WTO jurisprudence does not recognize such a role. I 
elaborate on what such an analysis could look like but that is beyond the ambit of this paper. 
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public interest balancing would take place in considering whether to disclose trade secrets, but 
have not made this explicitly the case in the treaty or in guidance to member states in 
implementing the treaty. 
 
Some support for at least a balancing with the public interest can be found in Article 39.3 
which addresses marketing approval for pharmaceutical and agricultural products.  It states” 
 
Members, when requiring, as a condition of approving the marketing of pharmaceutical 
or of agricultural chemical products which utilize new chemical entities, the submission 
of undisclosed test or other data, the origination of which involves a considerable effort, 
shall protect such data against unfair commercial use. In addition, Members shall protect 
such data against disclosure, except where necessary to protect the public, or unless steps 
are taken to ensure that the data are protected against unfair commercial use. 
Thus a first look at Article 39.3 notes that it only imposes obligations of governments 
regarding the protection of such information in very specific circumstances: only when they 
require that such information be submitted for marketing approval of agricultural and 
pharmaceutical products which use new chemical entities. Thus when the information is 
submitted for purposes other than marketing approval, the obligations in Article 39.3 are not 
triggered. Where the data does not concern new chemical entities, the obligation is not triggered.  
Where the data is not about agricultural or pharmaceutical products the obligation in Article 39.3 
is not triggered. 
 
The first question that arises is the scope of the information to be protected.  The same term, 
“undisclosed”, is used to describe the data or information suggesting that therefore the same 
definition of undisclosed information is being used for Article 39.2 and 39.3.   Article 39.2 uses 
the term 'information lawfully in their control from being disclosed to' in its chapeau, whereas 
secrecy is defined in the subprovisions below.  Does this actually mean that Article 39.3 
protection extends to information that is undisclosed but that does not necessarily meet the 
standard of secrecy in Article 39.2(a), (b) and (c)? That seems to be an absurd reading of an 
article that should be taken to be using similar terms to have similar meaning.  This may be borne 
out by the fact that the only requirements for triggering the obligation in 39.3 is that the 
information be undisclosed, and that the origination of the data required considerable effort.    
 Thus the undisclosed information that must be protected under Article 39.3 must conform 
at least to the requirements of undisclosed information that must be protected under Article 39.2. 
However, Article 39.3 adds an additional criterion that the origination of the information must 
have involved considerable effort.  A plain reading would suggest that this is an additional 
requirement for such information to meet, rather than an alternative to the one already described 
in article 39.2.  There is no compelling reason anywhere else in the text that requires us to 
believe that the meaning of undisclosed data or information as used in Article 39.2 is not at least 
bounded by what is required in article 39.2.157   
  Article 39.3 then requires states to protect such information from not just unfair 
competition but from actual disclosure, thus going beyond simply preventing use.  Disclosure 
                                                 
157 DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS: THIRD EDITION, 427 (2008) 
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can thus only be justified in the interests of protecting the public. The last line also suggests that 
disclosure can be allowed provided that unfair commercial use is prevented, suggesting that 
disclosure is allowed as long as the rules allow a trade secret holder to nevertheless prevent 
others from making use of the data under article 10bis of the Paris Convention and footnote 10 of 
article 39.2.  There has been no interpretation of this provision in the WTO Dispute Settlement 
process.158  However, several commentaries have outlined what they believe to be the content and 
extent of this requirement. Gervais addresses the negotiating background. He does not 
specifically address the issue of what would constitute 'protection of the public' except to note 
that it should be commensurate with the exceptions in GATT article XX(b). However, given that 
TRIPS has its own general exceptions, in Article7 and 8, as well as article 30 and 31 on patents, 
and Article 13 on copyright, it would seem more appropriate to refer to those rather than the 
GATT.  In that context, given the lack of a specific exception in Article 39, it is appropriate to 
refer to the manner in which the public interest is defined in Article 8.1 which is: 
 
Article 8 - Principles 
1.    Members may, in formulating or amending their laws and regulations, adopt 
measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to promote the public 
interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological 
development, provided that such measures are consistent with the provisions of this 
Agreement. 
 
Thus the public interest, or protection of the public, encompasses measures to protect public 
health and nutrition. To the extent that promotion of the public interest encompasses 
environmental regulation it is also covered, although this is measured by the extent to which such 
an interest is vital to socio-economic and technological development.  Some further guidance on 
Article 39.3 framing of “protection of the public” can also be found in looking at the evolution of 
this phrase and related concepts in the various drafts preceding the final TRIPS text. The 
Brussels Draft Article 4A, provided for a five year exclusivity against use by the agency (e.g. 
relying on the data for approval of drugs), and additionally protection against disclosure with the 
same exact wording of “except where necessary to protect the public”.159  However, almost all of 
the article was bracketed meaning that it was a proposal but not part of the text per se.  In the 
Draft of July 23, 1990; the conditions under which disclosure could take place were elaborated in 
articles 3Ab.1 – 3Ac.2 Thus 3A.b.2 allowed disclosure only to the extent “required to carry out 
necessary government functions”.160  This seems somewhat broader than the language restricting 
it to those conditions necessary to protect the public. On the other hand, a governmental interest 
may be construed somewhat more narrowly than a public interest, thus affecting the standing of 
those who seek information. Thus under that formulation, individuals, especially under FOIA 
frameworks, would likely not have standing to seek disclosure. In any case, the proposed text 
would provide for confidentiality obligations or agreements to be imposed or negotiated with the 
person to whom the information was disclosed. Thus broad public dissemination was clearly not 
                                                 
158 WTO Analytical Index. Available at: 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/trips_03_e.htm#article39B 
159 See DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS: THIRD EDITION, 421 (2008). 
160 See DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS: THIRD EDITION, 423 (2008). 
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envisioned as part of what would be allowed.  This is especially clear in Article 3Ab.3, which 
allows disclosure to protect human health or safety or to protect the environment, but also allows 
limits to be placed on the person to whom the information is disclosed.161 On the other hand, 
proposed text in Article 3Ac.1 offered an alternative that general disclosure is allowed but only 
to the degree indispensable to inform the public of the actual or potential danger of a product. 
This at least seemed to envision release to the public as a whole, without any compensation. 
Finally, Article 3Ab.1 at least envisioned that the use of the information by a third party under a 
government permission or license would be appropriately compensated suggesting at least that it 
was understood that trade secrets could indeed be made available under a compulsory license as 
long as confidentiality obligations were imposed.162 
 The question then is whether the final text is narrower or broader than the original drafts. 
The lack of a requirement to allow for confidentiality obligations or the opportunity to negotiate 
such obligations suggests that the limits on receivers of such information have been removed 
from the final text.  The rationales for such release may however be narrowed where protection 
of the public is not framed in particular as action necessary to protect human health and safety or 
the environment. However, what is finally clear is that disclosure for the needs of protection of 
the public was the final text that won out, likely encompassing protection of human health and 
safety and protection of the environment.  Broader disclosure to the general public is also 
envisioned as part of this article as the proposals to limit such disclosure did not survive the 
negotiating process. The article even provides a dual framework for disclosure: thus where steps 
are taken to ensure protection against unfair commercial use, there may be no need to actually 
show a need to protect the public. 
Looking at “sufficient protection against unfair commercial use”, a key question is whether 
the unfair commercial use described in 39.3 has the same meaning as “a manner contrary to 
honest commercial practices” as used in 39.2. This is key as the definition of the latter is 
provided by a minimum level in Footnote10.  The definition thus includes at a minimum: 
 breach of contract 
 breach of confidence 
 inducement to breach 
 acquisition by third parties who know, or were grossly negligent in failing to know, that 
such practices were involved in the acquisition. 
The protection must be against: 
 disclosure 
 acquisition and 
 use 
 
through any of the methods above. 
 
 There is little guidance as to whether ‘unfair commercial practices’ and ‘dishonest 
practices’ are indeed the same concept i.e. that “unfair commercial practices” amount to the same 
thing as “contrary to honest practices.”  This wording is drawn directly from the Paris 
                                                 
161 See DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS: THIRD EDITION, 423 (2008). 
162 See DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS: THIRD EDITION, 423 (2008). 
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Convention Article 10bis2, and to which many countries responded by applying their law on 
unfair competition. However, at the very least it is clear that while unfair commercial 'use' is 
limited to use of the information by third parties, as is logically implicated by the text, Article 
39.2 provides broader protection including both acquisition and disclosure of the information.  
More interesting is that the obligation in Article 39.3 does not simply directly refer to the scope 
of protection in 39.2 suggesting that a different scope of protection was truly meant. Some clue 
may however be gleaned from the phrasing in 39.1, that the obligation to protect under paragraph 
2 and 3, is done so in pursuance of the obligation to protect against unfair competition from 
Article 10bis of the Paris Convention. Thus, it may be that the specific obligations of article 39.2 
are subsets of the general protection afforded by unfair competition law or that they are specific 
implementations of the unfair competition obligation in Article 10bis of the Paris Convention.  It 
is not clear that we should apply the definition in Article 39.2 rather than the standard in Article 
10bis of the Paris Convention which extends at a minimum to: 
 
(i) all acts of such a nature as to create confusion by any means whatever with the 
establishment, the goods, or the industrial or commercial activities, of a competitor; 
(ii) false allegations in the course of trade of such a nature as to discredit the 
establishment, the goods, or the industrial or commercial activities, of a competitor;   
(iii) indications or allegations the use of which in the course of trade is liable to 
mislead the public as to the nature, the manufacturing process, the characteristics, the 
suitability for their purpose, or the quantity, of the goods. 
 
The minimum standard in Article 10bis remains very different from that articulated in 
article 39.2 which identifies and focuses on the manner of acquisition, disclosure and use.  It may 
be that the basic article 39.2 is additional rather than alternative to article 10bis(3) of the Paris 
Convention, but they clearly set different thresholds and since article 39.3 very explicitly does 
not refer to article 39.2, a plain reading suggests that the applicable threshold is more likely to be 
Article 10bis. 
 
  Under 39.2 the disclosure, acquisition and use must be a) without consent and b) 
contrary to honest practices.  This is in contrast to 39.3 which only requires that if the data meets 
the requirements of: 
- being mandatorily submitted data for approval of marketing pharmaceutical and 
agricultural new chemical entities; 
- is undisclosed 
- its origination requires investment and effort; 
then protection is afforded against 
- unfair commercial use 
- disclosure (with the exception discussed above) 
 
Where unfair commercial use is a subset rather than an alternative to the broader protection of 
dishonest practices as defined in 39.2 and Article 10bis of the Paris Convention, then such data 
must be protected against use that represents at a minimum; 
- breach of contract 
- breach of confidence 
- inducement to breach 
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- use of information acquired by third parties who know, or were grossly negligent in 
failing to know, that such practices were involved in the acquisition. 
 
This suggests that the minimum level of protection required is relatively narrow but 
nevertheless that use by third parties not the government is clearly encompassed.163 This is not to 
say that countries may not choose to make the unfair competition protection referred to in Article 
39.3 and 39.2 co-extensive with that of broader unfair competition law in the domestic arena, but 
there is no requirement to do so, given the very carefully narrow approach in article 39 itself to 
that definition.164 That definition must be limited only to acquisition through breach or dishonest 
practices. Importantly, the unfair commercial use element of article 39.3 has to be read in 
conjunction with the disclosure element.  The article clearly contemplates that the government 
may engage in disclosure of information but then places an obligation on the government to 
prevent parties from using such information in ways that meet the unfair commercial use 
definition in the Paris Convention or Article 39.2.  However, in relation to information that the 
government has in its hands, the requirement to protect against unfair commercial use probably 
requires the government to at least stand in the place of the holder of the undisclosed information 
in relation to the breaches referred to in Article 39.2. Thus the government should act against 
third parties or allow the holder of the information to pursue claims against those who acquire 
the information from the government in ways that are dishonest, and prevent them from 
acquiring, disclosing or using the information in dishonest way. At the very least the government 
may be required to protect such information against use, even where it is disclosed. 
 
 This also means that outside the realm of new chemical entities, Article 39 of TRIPS does 
not present a barrier to government disclosure, provided that the information is not used, 
acquired or disclosed to third parties in violation of article 39.2.  In any case, as long as the 
government provides a remedy in civil or other law against use by third parties not the 
government, there is no limit on the government's disclosure of information submitted to it, 
except in the specific subject area of information submitted for marketing approval of NCEs for 
pharmaceutical and agricultural products.  Thus in the area of toxic chemicals that are not new 
chemical entities relating to pharmaceutical or agricultural products Article 39.3 of TRIPS does 
not pose a barrier to government disclosure of submitted information. Even for pharmaceutical 
and agricultural products information not being submitted for marketing approval but for other 
purposes such as safety and health management and vigilance, government disclosure is not 
limited by article 39.3.  
 
The clearest understanding from the foregoing analysis is that, to the extent that unfair 
commercial 'use' is prevented, Article 39 does not present a barrier to government disclosure of 
information submitted to it.  The article clearly contemplates that disclosure could occur and to 
the extent that the government imposed conditions on those who receive the information, or the 
public at large not to use the information in ways that violate domestic unfair competition law, 
including acts covered under the Paris Convention Article 10 bis, and article 39.2 of TRIPS, then 
                                                 
163 The majority of literature concerns itself with the extent to which Article 39.3 requires periods of exclusivity of 
the data for government use or if it allows government us at all.  That discussion is beyond the scope of this 
paper which concerns itself with use by third parties and with disclosure, but for more on that discussion see: 
164 SATWANT REDDY & GURDIAL SINGH SANDHU, REPORT ON STEPS TO BE TAKEN BY GOVERNMENT OF INDIA IN THE 
CONTEXT OF DATA PROTECTION PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 39.3 OF TRIPS AGREEMENT iv (2007). 
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disclosure is allowed.  To the extent that Article 39.3 provides greater protection for information 
related to pharmaceutical and agricultural test data, then other government submitted information 
should benefit, at the very least from a disclosure exception that is co-extensive with that in 
Article 39.3.  This relies on the definition of undisclosed information in both Article 39.2 and 
39.3 being the same, and in a recognition that Article 39.3 does not encompass the entirety of 
information submitted to the government. 
 
To conclude, the TRIPS Agreement has not been traditionally interpreted to address the 
ways in which Article 39 affected disclosure of government submitted information beyond the 
scope of marketing approval for new chemical entities in agriculture and pharmaceuticals.  A 
closer examination shows that there are significant implications for access to information when 
Article 39.2 providing for broad trade secret protection encompasses government submitted 
information not covered by Article 39.3.  Most importantly, governments must be aware that in 
creating and implementing access to information regimes for information submitted to the 
government they cannot create expectations that such information will be kept secret, while 
allowing for disclosure. This can only be done where the access to information legislation (in 
tandem with the trade secret legislation) explicitly states that such disclosure is contemplated.  
Thus in the cases examined earlier in the article, the current US approach can be seen as 
compliant because it poses an absolute barrier to the disclosure of trade secrets.  The Indian 
approach, because of the manner in which the FOIA legislation explicitly states that trade secret 
will be balanced against the public interest is also compliant with the TRIPS framework as is the 
EU framework in the context of environmental information.  Within the realm of environmental 
information, the EU Transparency and Aarhus Regulations can be seen as compliant, again 
because of the explicit statements regarding the specific balancing of trade secret protection 
against the public interest.  
 As countries negotiate and sign a new generation of TRIPS-plus treaties that address 
issues such as trade secrets, the extent of this new protection could further serve to limit the 
narrow window for disclosure provided in TRIPS. The next section examines whether this is the 
case in the group of early regional and bilateral free trade agreements, primarily by the US and 
the EU. 
B. TRIPS-Plus protections in Regional and Bilateral Free Trade Agreements 
 
 In the period subsequent to TRIPS, the US and the EU pursued bilateral and regional free 
trade agreements containing intellectual property provisions (sometimes called “TRIPS-Plus” 
provisions) as well as environmental provisions.  These generally increased the level of 
protection and enforcement for intellectual property.165 These were also at least initially focused 
on existing developing country partners (e.g. US-Peru and US-Chile) but, also in the case of the 
US included agreements such as the US Korea FTA, the US Australia FTA and most recently the 
negotiations for a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the US and the 
EU. These were mostly carried out in the form of model agreements which the US or the EU 
then negotiated with partners and which were modified in successive negotiations to reflect 
advantages that had been gained in prior negotiations. In earlier model US agreements, there was 
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little or no text on trade secrets other than that related to undisclosed test data for pharmaceutical 
and agricultural products.166 The TPP reflects a shift in US policy to address the issue and thus 
this paper provides an analysis of the extent to which it may alter the TRIPS balance on 
disclosure of trade secrets. On the side of the European Union, negotiations with the group of 
African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries have resulted in agreements only one of which 
contains any substantive obligations on intellectual property, the EU-Cariforum Economic 
Partnership Agreement.167 That agreement contains no obligations on trade secrets or undisclosed 
information. Otherwise, the EU has signed agreements with the Andean countries with 
provisions on exclusivity for pharmaceutical and agricultural test data168 but nothing on trade 
secrets generally.  The same can be found in the EU-Canada Trade Agreement169 and almost all 
other EU trade agreements.170 Ongoing negotiations with India do not appear to address the 
issue.171 In part, the EU lack of inclusion of trade secrets in its negotiations for TRIPS-Plus FTA 
may be attributed to the lack of EU harmonization which is only now being addressed with the 
Directive on the Protection of Undisclosed Information.172 The next section examines the key US 
trade agreement represe4nting a shift in the treatment of trade secrets. 
 
1. The Trans-Pacific Partnership 
 
The Trans-Pacific Partnership173 is the most recent FTA signed by the US with a group of Pacific 
Rim countries including, Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New 
Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam.  
 
Language similar to Article 39.3 of TRIPS providing for protection of undisclosed test 
data (for pharmaceuticals) is covered by Article 18.50 requiring a 5 year exclusivity period 
before it can be relied upon or used for marketing approval of new chemical entities.174 
Paragraph 3 provides for an exception for action aimed at protecting public health in line with: 
 
                                                 
166 See e.g. US-Chile FTA, US-CAFTA-DR FTA, US-Korea FTA 
167  
168 EU-Colombia-Peru FTA Article 231 
169 Canada – EU Trade Agreement, Article 20.29 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/september/tradoc_152806.pdf  
170 EU-Chile (nothing on trade secrets or undisclosed information), Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (with Algeria, 
Egypt, Israel, Jordan, , Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Tunisia, Syria, and primarily limited to trade in 
goods), EU-Korea FTA, EU-Mexico FTA (nothing on trade secrets or undisclosed information), EU-Central 
America FTA (nothing on trade secrets or undisclosed information), EU-Singapore FTA (protection of test data 
in Article 11.33-11.34, nothing on trade secrets), EU-Thailand FTA (protection of test data in Article 8, nothing 
on trade secrets) EU-Vietnam FTA (protection of test data in Article 9, nothing on trade secrets), EU-Ukraine 
DCFTA (protection of test data in Article 222, nothing on trade secrets). 
171 This is true for the EU-Japan FTA, EU-Mercosur. No official information on the scope of IPR negotiations is 
available for the EU-Philippines FTA, The EU-Thailand FTA, EU-Tunisia Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade 
Agreement, EU-Israel Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement. 
172 Directive 2016/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on the Protection of 
Undisclosed Know-how and Business Information (trade secrets) against their unlawful acquisition, use and 
disclosure, 2016 O.J. (L157) 59. 
173 Trans-Pacific Partnership signed Feb. 4, 2016 in Auckland, New Zealand (not yet entered into force.) Depositary 
text available at: https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/about-us/who-we-are/treaty-making-process/trans-pacific-
partnership-tpp (last visited August 15, 2016) 
174 Article 18.47 cover Agricultural products and provides for a 10 year exclusivity period.  
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(a) the Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health; 
(b) any waiver of any provision of the TRIPS Agreement granted by WTO Members in 
accordance with the WTO Agreement to implement the Declaration on TRIPS and Public 
Health and that is in force between the Parties; or 
(c) any amendment of the TRIPS Agreement to implement the Declaration on TRIPS and 
Public Health that enters into force with respect to the Parties. 
 
The Declaration does envision countries using exceptions and limitations under TRIPS 
but since TRIPS itself provides no exceptions to trade secrets except for those in Article 39.3, at 
the very least disclosure for public interest purposes seems to still be available under the TPP.   
 
Article 18.78 addresses increased protection of trade secrets. The definition of trade 
secrets remains the same as that in TRIPs Article 39.2 and the obligation to provide protection 
retains the language of TRIPS Article 39.2 and its footnote 10.175 The provision explicitly 
includes state owned enterprises within the ambit of article 39.2, something which has been 
considered a major accomplishment by the USTR176, but which suggests at the same time that 
state enterprises and the state were not necessarily seen by the TPP signatories as covered by 
article 39.2. As I have argued above, that belief is likely mistaken. The TPP expands criminal 
penalties for willful and unauthorized access and acquisition over computer systems,177 and 
importantly for the purposes of this paper, it criminalizes “the fraudulent disclosure, or 
alternatively, the unauthorised and wilful disclosure, of a trade secret, including by means of a 
computer system.”178 This potentially includes such disclosure by a government employee, 
although not as specific as the US Trade Secrets Act prohibition.179 Taken on its face, the specific 
prohibition against unauthorized disclosure, excludes authorization by law and places such 
authorization in the hands of the trade secret holder.  More specifically, by adopting such a broad 
prohibition on disclosure of trade secrets it appears that TPP signatories, at the very least have 
made it more difficult, if not impossible to justify disclosure of trade secrets by reference to the 
public interest, at least in those cases that operate much like general FOIAs.  This presents a 
conflict for those countries that have such possibilities, e.g. India.  To that extent, the TPP 
countries appear to have committed themselves to a framework that has the same effect as that in 
the US when it comes to disclosure of information, outside the realm of pharmaceutical (including 
biologics) and agricultural test data. 
 
Criminal liability, however, may be limited to a small list of activities as enunciated in 
paragraph 3.180 The sanctions are limited to unauthorized acts and a party remains free to exclude 
acts by government employees from criminal liability because they are not for commercial 
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176 See https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Chapter-Summary-Intellectual-Property.pdf  
177 Para 2 
178 Para 2 
179 See supra note ? 
180 (a) the acts are for the purposes of commercial advantage or financial gain; 
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(c) the acts are intended to injure the owner of such trade secret; 
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advantage or commercial gain.181 It remains unclear the extent to which disclosure by a 
government employee within the ambit of legislatively authorized disclosure of a trade secret 
would be considered compliant with a country’s obligations under the TPP even under such an 
exclusion, where it did not provide for at least civil liability. Given that paragraph 1 of the article 
states that the basic non-criminal liability is founded, at a minimum, in article 39.2 of TRIPS, the 
analysis of TRIPS above applies to non-criminal liability.  Thus, under paragraph 3, states under 
the TPP remain free to exclude from criminal liability acts that would otherwise be caught by 
paragraph 2, by limiting liability to only one or more of the acts in the closed list. It may be 
appropriate for TPP states wishing to maintain their access to information regimes to ensure that 
no criminal liability extend to acts that are not for commercial gain or advantage, thus ensuring 
that disclosure by government actors does not fall afoul of TPP obligations.  At the most, it may 
be appropriate to limit criminal liability under the TPP to those acts “[…] directed by or for the 
benefit of or in association with a foreign economic entity;” which seems to be the primary 
concern driving the criminalization provisions.  
 
 The TPP has the potential to be severely limiting even in regard to the room provided by 
the TRIPS Agreement. However, to the extent that the opportunity to limit criminal liability to one 
of the areas in the closed list, the TPP may be implemented in a manner that does not further close 
off access to information. 
 
 
IV.  
IMPLICATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTING CURRENT AND FUTURE ENVIRONMENTAL SUBMISSION AND 
ACCESS TO INFORMATION REGIMES 
 
 The analysis in the previous section bears out the concern that TRIPS and TRIPS-plus 
regimes may have hidden landmines in them for the unwary government.  Some of the current 
frameworks in different countries have been fortunate to have implemented their access to 
information regimes in ways that have, largely accidentally, fallen within the TRIPS framework.  
However, it is also clear that, under TRIPS, those countries that impose, in their access to 
information regimes, a bald prohibition on disclosure of trade secret information, do so in a way 
that is not actually required by the TRIPS Agreement.   This means that some countries, such as 
the US, provide overly narrow disclosure regimes especially for access to environmental 
information. An effective access to information regime can co-exist with trade secret protection 
at the domestic level provided that no legitimate expectation of non-disclosure is created by the 
legislation implementing the access framework.  The analysis however, is less encouraging for 
those countries whose legislation is insufficiently specific on this matter and whose courts may 
be allowing for disclosure in the public interest despite the existence of legislation the 
specifically prohibits disclosure of trade secrets. If that is the case, such countries are likely to be 
out of compliance with their obligations under TRIPS Article 39.2.  It behooves countries 
concerned about the effectiveness of their access to information regimes to revisit their 
legislation to ensure that this is not the case. 
 
 This issue becomes even more urgent given that countries have signed up, or are planning 
to sign up to international environmental treaties with submission and disclosure agreements. 
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Precisely because many of these agreement themselves provide little guidance on the extent to 
which trade secrets can and should be disclosed, an understanding of the TRIPS framework is 
crucial. The ways in which these agreements interact with trade secret protection vary, although 
many of the texts show little real thought for what the interaction should be.  A key recent 
example of this is the Convention on Biological Diversity and its several protocols. 
 
The Convention on Biological Diversity182 (CBD), is in many ways an access to 
information treaty in that it aims to regulate the access to, terms of disclosure and use of 
information related to genetic resources and the distribution of benefits from such disclosure and 
use.  In that sense it should reflect a balance that allows access, but makes effective the ability of 
all to trace and assess when and how benefit sharing should occur. To do so, transparency about 
who the holders of genetic resources are and the terms on which they will provide access is 
fundamental as is transparency about who the users of genetic resources are, the uses to which 
they put genetic resources, and the terms on which they are willing or able to share the benefits 
from their use of the genetic resources.  The CBD has several provisions where either 
information is to be shared and submitted to the CBD institutions or parties are mandated to 
encourage or require submission of information to relevant national institutions.183  The CBD 
contains no guidance or rule on how access to information that it requires or implies should be 
balanced against protection of undisclosed information. The only guidance may be that, as in 
many articles, the obligations are limited to those which are ‘practicable’ or are ‘appropriate’ 
seemingly leaving significant room to determine what is practicable or appropriate. Thus, from a 
strictly legal viewpoint, these terms seem to pose no barrier to countries placing limits on access 
to information based on concerns about confidentiality or protection of trade secrets.  
 
 The Nagoya Protocol184 aims to more explicitly lay out the content of the provisions of 
Article 15, 16 and 19 of the CBD. It has several provisions requiring the submission of 
information. 
 
Article 6.3(e)  
                                                 
182 Convention on Biological Diversity signed June 5, 1992 entry into force December 29, 1993 1760 U.N.T.S 79 
(1993). 
183 Article 14(1)(a) - Introduce appropriate procedures requiring environmental impact assessment of its proposed 
projects that are likely to have significant adverse effects on biological diversity with a view to avoiding or 
minimizing such effects and, where appropriate, allow for public participation in such procedures; 
 
Article 15(7) - 7. Each Contracting Party shall take legislative, administrative or policy measures, as appropriate, 
and in accordance with Articles 16 and 19 and, where necessary, through the financial mechanism established by 
Articles 20 and 21 with the aim of sharing in a fair and equitable way the results of research and development and 
the benefits arising from the commercial and other utilization of genetic resources with the Contracting Party 
providing such resources. Such sharing shall be upon mutually agreed terms. 
 
Article 19(2) - Each Contracting Party shall take all practicable measures to promote and advance priority access on 
a fair and equitable basis by Contracting Parties, especially developing countries, to the results and benefits arising 
from biotechnologies based upon genetic resources provided by those Contracting Parties. Such access shall be on 
mutually agreed terms. 
184 Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from 
their Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity, signed October 29, 2010 entry into force October 12, 
2014. 
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3. Pursuant to paragraph 1 above, each Party requiring prior informed consent shall take 
the necessary legislative, administrative or policy measures, as appropriate, to: 
[…] 
(e) Provide for the issuance at the time of access of a permit or its equivalent as evidence 
of the decision to grant prior informed consent and of the establishment of mutually 
agreed terms, and notify the Access and Benefit sharing Clearing-House accordingly; 
 
This implies that the body requiring prior informed consent shall create such information, 
have possession of the contract outlining mutually agreed terms and communicate these to the 
ABS Clearing House.  The language may allow for certification of the existence of these rather 
than the actual documents themselves but it already creates a provision that requires submission 
of such information to a national body with an obligation to communicate it to an international 
clearing house mechanism.  Where such information is publicly accessible, the interaction with 
undisclosed information then comes into play. 
 
The Nagoya Protocol also requires submission of information in other articles185 but 
crucially, the submission of information to the ABS is “without prejudice to the protection of 
confidential information.”186  The content of this broad brush exception remains to be elaborated 
but one thing to note is that is embodies a similar construction as that under the Aarhus 
Convention. Thus while it appears to suggest that any prejudice can prevent submission of 
information, it may be that, as under the Aarhus Convention, some harm or prejudice may be 
contemplated and balanced against the interest in accessing the information.  Nevertheless, by 
stating such a broad but vague exception, the protocol is likely to be implemented in such a way 
that a legitimate expectation of confidentiality in relation to such information is created. 
 
In contrast, the Cartagena Protocol187 is much clearer and elaborates on what exactly it 
means for information to be protected from disclosure. Article 21 specifically address 
confidentiality and states (all italic in bold my emphasis): 
 
1. The Party of import shall permit the notifier to identify information submitted under 
the procedures of this Protocol or required by the Party of import as part of the advance 
informed agreement procedure of the Protocol that is to be treated as confidential. 
Justification shall be given in such cases upon request.  
2. The Party of import shall consult the notifier if it decides that information identified by 
the notifier as confidential does not qualify for such treatment and shall, prior to any 
disclosure, inform the notifier of its decision, providing reasons on request, as well as an 
opportunity for consultation and for an internal review of the decision prior to disclosure.  
3. Each Party shall protect confidential information received under this Protocol, 
including any confidential information received in the context of the advance informed 
agreement procedure of the Protocol. Each Party shall ensure that it has procedures to 
                                                 
185 Article 17(1)(a)(iii) - Such information, including from internationally recognized certificates of compliance 
where they are available, will, without prejudice to the protection of confidential information, be provided to 
relevant national authorities, to the Party providing prior informed consent and to the Access and Benefit-sharing 
Clearing-House, as appropriate; 
186 Id. 
187 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity signed January 29, 2000 in Cartagena 
entry into force 11 September 2003, 2226 U.N.T.S. 208 (2005).   
49 
protect such information and shall protect the confidentiality of such information in a 
manner no less favourable than its treatment of confidential information in connection 
with domestically produced living modified organisms.  
4. The Party of import shall not use such information for a commercial purpose, except 
with the written consent of the notifier.  
5. If a notifier withdraws or has withdrawn a notification, the Party of import shall 
respect the confidentiality of commercial and industrial information, including research 
and development information as well as information on which the Party and the notifier 
disagree as to its confidentiality.  
6. Without prejudice to paragraph 5 above, the following information shall not be 
considered confidential:  
(a) The name and address of the notifier;  
(b) A general description of the living modified organism or organisms;  
(c) A summary of the risk assessment of the effects on the conservation and sustainable 
use of biological diversity, taking also into account risks to human health; and  
(d) Any methods and plans for emergency response. 
 
The BCH very clearly states the information that may never be considered confidential, and 
while it allows for claims of confidentiality to be made it makes clear that: 
- Submission of required information and disclosure to the biosafety clearing house is 
required and that non-disclosure is an exception. Thus in the absence of such a claim of 
confidentiality, submission of information to the clearing house is automatic.  
- The decision on whether to refuse disclosure rests with the national authority and is 
discretionary, but must be justified by an assessment that the information is confidential, 
and any review of its decision need only be internal.  
- Where the authority does believe that the information is confidential then, unlike in the 
Aarhus Convention, Article 21 requires that such information be protected absolutely 
against disclosure. There appear to be no exceptions to this. 
- There are no restrictions on standing and access, according to the regulations of the BCH. 
Access to the BCH information is open to any person willing to register. There is also no 
need to request information once it has been submitted: it is always available. 
 
Overall, the details of the Cartagena Protocol show greater consideration of problems related 
to reconciling access to submitted information and claims of confidentiality and addresses them 
in a manner that balances the interests in confidentiality, but also the interests and goals of the 
treaty. As such it is much more likely to be implemented in a manner that does not create, at the 
domestic level, an expectation of confidentiality that would preclude disclosure of the 
information that is relevant to the effective implementation of the treaty 
 
 The example of the CBD, Nagoya Protocol and the Cartagena Protocol argues for greater 
and more explicit consideration in the negotiations of environmental treaties of the interaction 
with trade secret protection beyond simple vague declarations of “no prejudice”.  In particular, 
precisely because domestic systems have such a narrow framework within which to balance both 
trade secret protection and access to information, domestic legislation that implements these 
treaties must be clear that for the information necessary to make them effective, no legitimate 
expectation of non-disclosure should be created.  Failure to do so would expose the countries to 
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complaints at the WTO and would prevent true implementation of the environmental treaties 
treaties to which they are parties. 
 
 
 
